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TAKINGS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: REASONABLE
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS AFTER
PALAZZOLO AND TAHOE-SIERRA
GREGORY M. STEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1987 and 2000 the Supreme Court decided a large number of
takings cases, and landowners won most of them. With this gradual drift
toward the landowners' position and with no recent changes in Court
membership, Court-watchers had little reason to expect the beginning of the
21st century to produce any striking change in the direction of the Court's
takings decisions. The Court's first two rulings of the new century, however,
have largely disappointed property-rights advocates while heartening those
who favor the rights of government entities to regulate land. Most
surprisingly, the Court seems to have breathed new life into the investmentbacked expectations analysis featured prominently in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City ofNew York,' a 1978 case that many observers had
viewed as waning in importance during the 1990s.'
This Article examines the impact that Palazzolo v. Rhode Island' and
Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncilv. TahoeRegionalPlanningAgency, have
had on investment-backed expectations analysis. Part II provides a brief
background, examining Penn Central and the rise and apparent fall of
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Part Ilfocuses on Palazzolo.
Although the landowner nominally prevailed in Palazzolo, the Court's six
opinions collectively revived the dormant Penn Centralanalysis, and this Part
examines the overall impact of the Court's decision on the expectations
inquiry. Part IV turns to Tahoe-Sierra,a case in which the regulatory agency
*

Professor of Law, University of Tennessee (gstein@utk.edu); A.B. Harvard, 1983;
J.D. Columbia, 1986. This article has benefited enormously from the many helpful comments
I received from Peter Byrne, John Echeverria, Jeanette Kelleher, John Marshall, Andrea
Peterson, Andrew Schwartz, and Dan Siegel; from participants at the Georgetown
Environmental Law and Policy Institute's Fifth Annual Conference on Litigating Regulatory
Takings Claims; from participants at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Conference
of the Association of American Law Schools; and from participants at a University ofTennessee
College of Law Faculty Forum. I am grateful for generous research support provided by the
University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Dwight Merriam, Tahoe-Sierra: A Takings Time Warp?, 25 ZONING&PLAN.
L. REP. 41, 45 (2002) (referring to Penn Central as "reinvigorated-if you believe it ever lost
its strength').
3. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
4. 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
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prevailed. The Court had less reason in Tahoe-Sierrato discuss investmentbacked expectations analysis, but the case reaffirms the prominent role Penn
Centralis likely to play in future regulatory takings cases.
II. PENN CENTRAL AND REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS

Academic interest in the expectations of property owners was ignited by
Frank Michelman's 1967 article, Property,Utility, and Fairness.Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,' in which he
sought to determine why it was that courts ordered compensation for some
losses but not for others. More specifically, Michelman attempted to balance
the conflicting rights of property owners, their neighbors, and the government
charged with representing the wider community.
Paraphrasing Bentham, Michelman described property as "the
institutionally established understanding that extant rules governing the
relationships among men with respect to resources will continue in
existence," 6 a definition which is a precondition for the economically
productive use of property. At the same time, "[u]tilitarian property theory,
. . . for all its emphasis on security of expectations, easily allows that

compensation need not be paid in respect of investments which, when they
were made, . . . were of a sort which society had adequately made known

should not become the object of expectations of continuing enjoyment."7
Property owners can reasonably expect that they will continue to own the
bundle of rights they acquired, Michelman recognized, but these owners
should also be aware that this bundle of rights may be modified over time.
Owners must recognize, as well, that their neighbors have expectations arising
from their own property ownership, and "you proceed at your own risk when
you violate other people's apparently crystallized and justifiable
expectations." 8 If the government responds to this violation, the owner should
not be entitled to compensation, for "social action which merely.., brings a
deliberate gamble to its denouement, raises no question of compensability." 9
The Supreme Court first embraced Michelman's approach in Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York. ° The Penn Central Court
refused to adopt firm rules for application in takings cases, preferring to
decide each case on a fact-specific basis. Even as it backed away from per se

5. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
6. Id. at 1212.
7. Id. at 1241 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 1243 (discussing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
9. Id. at 1239.
10. 438 U.S. 104(1978). The Court actually cited Michelman's article once before Penn
Centralbut did not discuss it. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 90 n.2 (1969) (Brennan,
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rules, however, the Court listed several factors lower courts must consider
when resolving these cases, including "the extent to which the regulation has
The Court
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.""
observed that it had previously rejected takings claims when the government
action in question "did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for
Fifth Amendment purposes"'" and concluded that New York's Landmarks
Preservation Law "does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn
Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel."' 3 Thus, the
closer a property interest is to core property rights, the more reasonable it is
for an owner to develop expectations as to its use of that interest and the
greater the likelihood a court will find a deprivation of that interest to be a
taking.14
Between 1978 and 2001, state courts decided numerous takings cases in
which the owner's expectations were at issue, with one fact pattern occurring
particularly often. In this typical scenario, a party owned property that
became subject to land-use controls such as environmental restrictions or
historic preservation laws. That owner then conveyed the property to a
successor, who acquired the land with either actual or imputed knowledge of
the existing restriction. " The successor attempted, unsuccessfully, to secure
permission to develop the property and then brought a takings claim against
the state or subdivision of the state. In nearly every case, the state court held
for the regulatory authority, noting that a successor who acquired property
with knowledge of an existing land-use restriction could not reasonably have
held investment-backed expectations that the property could be freely

I1. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. More particularly, the Court stated:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions have
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
.1d. (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 125 (citing various cases).
13. Id. at 136.
14. Cf.Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (quoting Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)) (noting that a mere
expectation or need does not rise to the level of a reasonable investment-backed expectation).
15. In examples in which property changes hands after a new land-use restriction takes
effect, this Article will refer to the pre-enactment owner as "he" and the post-enactment
successor to title as "she," except where this pronoun usage contradicts the facts of an actual
case.
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developed.' 6 This common result has come to be known as "the notice rule."' 7
Even as state courts were applying the notice rule vigorously, the Supreme
Court began to hint that it might be moving away from a consistent
application of the expectations test.' 8 The Court did not decide a notice-rule
case directly until Palazzolo in 2001, but in earlier cases raising expectations
issues, the Court suggested that it might wish to reconsider and reduce the
importance of investment-backed expectations in takings analysis. In Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission,9 for example, the Court noted that the
property owners did not obtain a reduced bundle of rights, even though they
acquired their land after the state began to implement a more restrictive landuse policy.2' The Court specifically stated, "So long as the Commission could
not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating
them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full
property rights in conveying the lot."'" Five years later, in Lucas v. South

16. See generally Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use
Law, Pre-EnactmentOwners, and Post-Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO STATE L.J. 89, 91 n. 12
(2000) [hereinafter Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?] (citing cases in which the court
concluded that an owner is deemed to be on notice of all laws existing at the time she acquires
property and thus cannot recover takings compensation). The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reached this result in Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300 (Mass.
1996), holding that "[alt the time [the plaintiff] purchased the property she had constructive
notice of the zoning map, which was available for viewing at the building inspector's office.
[S]he may not complain about the loss of aright she never acquired." Id. at 1303. A year
[..
later, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a claim by a post-enactment buyer, holding that
"[w]hatever taking claim the prior landowner may have had against the environmental
regulation of the subject parcel, any property interest that might serve as the foundation for such
a claim was not owned by claimant here who took title after the redefinition of the relevant
property interests." Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489, 490-91 (N.Y. 1997)
(mem.). The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached a similar result in early 2000 in Palazzolo
v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), rev 'd,533 U.S. 606 (2001), discussed infra
Part Ill. See also McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000), vacated and
remandedsub noin. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001).
17. It is important to note that this fact pattern represents only one of the many contexts
in which the issue of reasonable investment-backed expectations can arise. This pattern has
arisen quite often, however, and is nearly identical to the actual facts of Palazzolo. See infra
Part IIl.
18. The expectations test also has been criticized by numerous commentators. See, e.g.,
John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-FactorTest ReadyforHistory'sDustbin?, LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan. 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Echeverria, Three-Factor Test]; R.S.
Radford & J. David Breemer, GreatExpectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the
Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U.
ENTL L.J. 449 (2001).
19. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
20. Id. at 833 n.2.
21. Id.at834n.2.
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Carolina Coastal Council,22 the Court held that a regulatory taking is
compensable whenever it deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use
of his land.23 This later opinion did not import any consideration of an
owner's expectations into its analysis, except in those rare cases in which "the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."24
25
m. PALAzzoLo V. RHODE ISLAND

The Court's hints in Nollan and Lucas-and,more generally, the overall
direction of regulatory takings law during the 1990s-led many observers to
believe that the importance of Penn Centralmight be waning. Although the
Court produced six opinions in Palazzolo, at least five of the Justices
surprised these observers by indicating their support for a modified version of
the notice rule, citing Penn Central with approval. Section A of this Part
reviews the facts of Palazzolo, and Section B dissects the six opinions in an
effort to ascertain just what the Court said. Section C examines the
implications of Palazzolo for the different types of regulatory takings claims
that can arise.
A. The Facts,Briefly
Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI), acquired approximately twenty acres of coastal
property in 1959.26 After SGI obtained this property, Rhode Island enacted
legislation and promulgated regulations that significantly limited the ability
of coastal property owners such as SGI to use their property.27 When Rhode
Island revoked SGI's corporate charter in 1978 for failure to pay taxes, SGI's
property passed by operation of law to its sole shareholder, Anthony
Palazzolo. 8 Palazzolo subsequently sought permits to fill the property and

22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectationsin Takings Law, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LucAs 119, 124-27 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (evaluating the
impact of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council).
23. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-30.
24. Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted). Among the Justices who joined in the Court's result,

only Justice Kennedy, writing alone in concurrence, asked "whether the deprivation is contrary
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations." Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
26. !d. at 613.
27. Id. at 614. SGI apparently sold five of the seventy-four lots in issue and then
reacquired them in 1969, four years after the state enacted its wetlands protection law. Thus,
SGI was both a pre- and post-enactment owner as to these lots. Dwight H. Merriam, The
Palazzolo Palaestra,23 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 93, 95 (2000) (summarizing a conversation
with Anthony Palazzolo).
28. Palazzolo, 535 U.S. at 614.

TENNESSEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 69:891

later to build a private beach club.29 The Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council denied both proposals because they violated the state's
Coastal Resources Management Program and did not merit a special
exception.3 0 Palazzolo challenged the second denial in state court, arguing
that the state had inversely condemned his property and seeking compensation

of $3,150,000. 3'
The trial court ruled in favor of the state, and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court affirmed for three distinct reasons. 32 First, the court held that the case
was not ripe. 33 Nonetheless, the court next examined the merits ofPalazzolo 's
case and rejected his argument that he had been deprived of all economically
viable use of his property in violation ofLucas.34 This finding stemmed from
Palazzolo's failure to dispute evidence that the upland portion of his property
could be used and was worth $200,000. 3' Finally,,the court relied on the

notice rule to conclude that Palazzolo had no right to receive takings
compensation when the state applied laws and regulations that were already
in effect when he succeeded to ownership of the property.36 Palazzolo's
notice of these restrictions undermined his claim that the state had
constitutionally impaired his reasonable investment-backed expectations
under the flexible Penn Central test. "In light of these [pre-existing]
regulations, Palazzolo could not reasonably have expected that he could fill
the property... ,3' Even if Palazzolo had demonstrated that Rhode Island
had left him with no economically viable use for his property, as required by
Lucas, his implicit knowledge of the existing land-use regime when he
succeeded to ownership would demonstrate that "'the proscribed use interests
were not part of his ... title to begin with."' 3 1 Such a showing is fatal under
Lucas, said the court, for it demonstrates that Palazzolo's estate never
included the right to use the property in the manner he proposed. In other
words, he was not "deprived" of anything. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on all three of these issues.
B. The Supreme Court Headcount
Six members of the Court authored opinions in Palazzolo. At least five
of the Justices-and possibly as many as eight-reaffirmed the viability of

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at614-15.
Id.
Id. at615-16.
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
Id. at714.
Id. at 714-17.
Id. at715.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 715 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)).
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Penn Central's open-ended approach to analyzing reasonable investmentbacked expectations in the specific context Palazzolo presented. Given the
divided outcome and the sharp differences the Justices display in their
opinions, it is necessary to review the pertinent language in the Palazzolo
opinions with care. This is the only way to discern exactly what the Court
held on the issue of expectations and to calculate precisely how many of the
Justices stand behind each of the assertions in their various opinions. 9
The state argued and the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
Palazzolo's knowledge of legal restrictions existing when he obtained title to
the property served as an automatic bar to his regulatory takings claim.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court squarely rejects this contention,
noting at the outset that "[some] enactments are unreasonable and do not
become less so through passage of time or title ....
A State would be
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought
not to be the rule." Such a holding would be particularly unfair to the party
owning the land when a new restriction becomes effective.
That
owner-here, SGI-might not survive the process of ripening a claim of its
own but would have lost the ability to dispose of the property interest it
previously held. The fact that Palazzolo's notice of the restriction is not an
outright bar to his claim, however, does not imply that his knowledge is of no
relevance at all. The Court was fractured on the critical question of just how
much weight this factor should bear.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-member majority, began his analysis
by looking at some of the easier types of takings claims courts face. The most
straightforward type of claim is a direct condemnation. In a direct
condemnation, the government, as plaintiff, takes property under its power of
eminent domain. The government concedes that it is taking property, and
there usually is little problem establishing when the taking occurred and who
owned the property at that time. The Court confirms that an owner who
suffers a direct taking and then transfers the property to a successor may not
concurrently transfer the takings claim to that new owner.4
The Court's analysis suggests that there are two policy considerations in
direct condemnation cases, both of which support a rule prohibiting transfer
of the claim. First, at the time of the taking, "the fact and extent of the taking
39. Three of the Justices would have rejected Palazzolo's claim on ripeness grounds and
thought that the analysis should have ended there. Because these three Justices viewed the case
as one in which the Court could not yet intervene, they discussed the substantive notice rule
only in passing. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, raised the issue in just
a single footnote. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 645, 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justices Souter and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent. Justice Breyer,
writing separately, penned three additional paragraphs in response to the Court's discussion of
expectations. Id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As a result, the Court's overall analysis of the
notice rule is incomplete.
40. Id. at 627.
41. Id. at 628.
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are known."42 The case is crystallized and ripe immediately, so there is no
practical limitation on the original owner's ability to bring the claim promptly.
Second, there are persuasive reasons for prohibiting holders of claims from
transferring them. Courts that permit sellers to transfer claims to buyers are,
in essence, endorsing the sale of legal claims. There is a long history, backed
by valid public policy reasons, of rejecting transfers of interests in lawsuits.
For instance, common law restrictions against champerty and maintenance
remain strong in most states.4" There is no reason why the original owner
cannot bring his own claim, but there are valid reasons to prohibit him from
transferring his claim to a successor. If the owner at the time of the taking
subsequently transfers the property before receiving compensation, "any
award goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and . .. the right to
compensation is not passed to a subsequent purchaser."
Inverse condemnation claims are not as straightforward as direct takings.
In an inverse condemnation claim, the government does not acknowledge that
it is taking property. Rather, the property owner, as plaintiff, argues that a
government regulation has worked a de facto taking of the property. The

42.

Id.; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (noting that a pre-existing government

easement would constitute a limitation on an owner's title).
43. Champerty is defined as "[a]n agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a litigant
by which the stranger pursues the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any
judgment proceeds." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 182 (abr. 7th ed. 2000). An arm's-length
purchaser of property would appear to meet this definition. However, in the case of an unripe
claim, this purchaser arguably is acquiring only apotentiallawsuit.
Common law prohibitions on champerty remain strong in most states. See, e.g., Ari Dobner,
Comment, Litigationfor Sale, 144 U.PA. L. REv. 1529, 1543-46 (1996) (discussing the history
of discouraging trafficking in litigation and noting that, while the doctrine has eroded
somewhat, champerty remains illegal in most states and criminal in some); Joseph M. Perillo,
The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 443, 473-75 (1998)
(discussing the medieval prohibition on splitting the fruits of litigation and noting the tension
between the doctrine of champerty and the growth of free assignability of assets). But see
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 489-92 (1986) (questioning the modem need

for the champerty doctrine).
Federal law prohibits the assignment of any part of a claim against the United States
government for many of these same reasons. 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1994); United States v.
Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 (1952) (applying the federal Anti-Assignment Act and restating the
desirable policy goals advanced by the Act). The Shannon Court enumerated some of the
reasons for this prohibition, which include "'prevent[ing] persons of influence from buying up
claims against the United States,'... 'prevent[ing] possible multiple payment of claims,...
mak[ing] unnecessary the investigation of alleged assignments, and .. . enabl[ing] the

Government to deal with only the original claimant."' Id. at 291-92 (quoting United States v.
Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 360, 373 (1949)); see also United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17
(1958) (discussed infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text); Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271 (1939) (also discussed infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text). As to state law
parallels, see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
44. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (citing Danforth, 308 U.S. at 284).
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government defendant responds that it has regulated the property under its
police power and is under no obligation to pay the landowner.4
For notice-rule purposes, inverse claims are trickier to analyze than direct
takings, but some types of inverse claims are easier to evaluate than others.
The most straightforward type of inverse taking is one in which the
government physically occupies property.' Of all the types of inverse
condemnations that may occur, an inverse claim arising from physical
occupation of the property is the type that most resembles a direct taking.
Although the landowner, and not the government entity, initiates the claim,
there is little dispute about the facts in either case. There is usually no doubt
that there has been a physical occupation, no doubt when it occurred, and no
problem establishing who owned the property at that time.
The Palazzolo majority stated that inverse condemnations arising from
physical occupations are much like direct condemnations47 and noted that the
Court had drawn this parallel more than sixty years earlier, in Danforth v.
United States." Danforth recognizes that the precise effective times of both
a direct condemnation and an inverse physical condemnation are easy to
pinpoint and that the fact and extent of each type of taking are easy to
determine. As with direct condemnations, there is no reason in an inverse
physical taking analysis to abandon the traditional rule that only the owner at
the time of the taking is entitled to compensation.49
This rule may work fairly when the inverse condemnation claim is a
physical one, but other types of inverse condemnation claims look less like
direct takings. In particular, inverse condemnation suits that challenge how
the government applies a land-use regulation differ from suits in which the
government either concedes that it is taking property directly or physically

45. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 & n.2 (1980); United States v.
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257-58 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); cf Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d
1374, 1379-83 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding an inverse physical taking but refusing to award
compensation because the benefits to the landowner outweighed the losses).
47. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
48. 308 U.S. 271,284 (1939), cited in Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; see also United States
v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 25 (1958) (noting that "certainty is not lacking under the rule... which
fixes the 'taking' at the time of the entry into physical possession-a fact readily ascertainable
whether or not the Government makes use of condemnation proceedings, and whether or not
it ever files a declaration of taking").
49. See, e.g., Cole v. County of Santa Barbara, 2d Civil No. B147339, 2001 WL
1613856, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2001) (unpublished) (rejecting a claim by the
successor owner in a case in which the predecessor owner agreed to land-use restrictions and
accepted benefits inreturn, and noting that the successor owner "acquired the property subject
to an explicit recorded offer of dedication inwhich the prior landowner conveyed away the very
property interest at stake-the right to exclude the public from the property"), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 466 (2002).
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occupies property without formally condemning it. These "as-applied"
regulatory takings claims do "not mature until ripeness requirements have
been satisfied . . . [and] until this point an inverse condemnation claim
alleging a regulatory taking cannot be maintained."50 The Court's stringent
ripeness requirements mean that the owner at the time the law becomes
effective-unlike the owner at the time of a direct condemnation or an inverse
physical condemnation--cannot immediately maintain a regulatory takings
claim. If the pre-enactment owner cannot yet bring a ripe claim, the Court
was less willing to bar the successor from bringing a claim later. "It would be
illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the postenactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the claim
ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner."'"
The Court, then, would not categorically prohibit the successor owner
from bringing an as-applied regulatory takings claim. The original owner may
not have had an opportunity to ripen his claim, and the Court refused to adopt
a rule also barring the successor from bringing a claim, even if she buys with
knowledge of the intervening change in the law. The Court's analysis of this
point appears to treat all the different types of non-physical inverse takings in
the same way, an oversimplification that will be addressed in detail below. 2
Note that the Court's analysis conflates two different, if overlapping,
issues. The question of an owner's expectations can arise in the Lucas setting,
with an owner arguing that she has been deprived of all economically viable
use of her property and the government responding that its restriction already
formed an inherent limitation on the owner's use of her property when she
acquired it. The question Palazzolo addresses in the context of Lucas is
whether the owner's knowledge of pre-existing limitations is sufficient to
defeat her claim that she has been deprived of everything she had." Because
the Court ultimately rejected Palazzolo's Lucas argument, it had "no occasion
to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be
deemed a background principle of state law." 4 The expectations issue also
surfaces in claims of less-than-total takings that fall within the Penn Central
analytical framework. The per se Lucas rule does not apply in this distinct
50. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
51. Id.; see also infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing ripeness).
52. See infra Part III.C.
53. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30 (discussing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992)). The Supreme Court's detailed discussion of expectations in the context of a
Lucas-type categorical taking may imply that there are cases in which these expectations could
undercut an otherwise categorical takings claim. Id. If so, then Palazzolo contradicts the
Federal Circuit's recent opinion in Palm Beach IslesAssociatesv. United States, 231 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit held there that if a plaintiff suffers a Lucas-type
categorical taking, then the plaintiff "is entitled to a recovery without regard to consideration
of initial investment-backed expectations.... (They] are not a proper part of the analysis
.
at 1364.
.Id.
54. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
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setting, and a court must assess a variety of factors, including the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations, before reaching its decision as to
whether an owner has suffered a taking. The question Palazzolo addresses in
a Penn Centralanalysis is what weight the owner's knowledge of existing law
should bear.s"
The Court merges these two questions, stating that "the two holdings
together amount to a single, sweeping rule." ' Palazzolo did not suffer a
Lucas taking, 7 and the Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island courts for
further exploration of the Penn Central issue. The Court went through its
notice-rule analysis to justify its conclusion that Palazzolo's claim was not
conclusively barred, but the opinion does not establish just when claims of
this type may proceed. Note that the Court displayed no apparent concern
about the federalism questions it raised when it attempted to establish the
contours of a private owner's property rights under state law.5"
The discussion so far has reviewed the opinion of the five-member
majority, but the remaining four Justices, along with two members of the
majority, sparred in the five additional opinions. These Justices offered their
non-binding views as to the relevance of a successor owner's knowledge of
an intervening change in the law. To Justice Scalia, who was a member of the
Court's majority, "the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser
took title... should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the
restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking." 9 The successor owner
may be aware of the change in the law, but the successor's reasonable
55. See infra Part III.C.
56. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
57. It is worth noting that the Court rejected a Lucas-type claim even though the property
apparently retained only 6.35% of its value. Palazzolo sought compensation of $3,150,000, id.
at 616, and accepted the state trial court's finding that the property retained a value of $200,000,
id. at 630-3 1.
58. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: Teaching
Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 713 (2002) (discussing the federalism
issue); infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text; cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 & n.1
(2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing the limits of the United States Supreme Court's
deference to state high courts' interpretations of state law); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (holding that "the existence of a property interest is determined by
reference to 'existing rules... [of] state law"' (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972))).
The Rhode Island constitution states that a land-use regulation for environmental purposes
"shall not be deemed to be a public use of private property," but this provision dates back only
to 1986. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also Merriam, supra note 27, at 96. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court recognizes, however, that its own laws are subordinate to the federal Takings
Clause. Alegriav. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1252 (R.I. 1997) (noting that "this section, although
firmly evincing a strong Rhode Island policy favoring the preservation and the welfare of the
environment, cannot be interpreted by this Court to defeat the mandates of the Federal
Constitution").
59. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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expectations need not include the belief that the government will enforce a
law that takes property without compensation. "The 'investment-backed
expectations' that the law will take into account do not include the assumed
validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value
as to be unconstitutional. ' "w To one Justice, then, not only is a successor's
knowledge of a change in the law not a bar to the successor's claim, it is
wholly irrelevant.
Justice O'Connor, who also joined the Court's majority, concurred to
register her disagreement with Justice Scalia's view of this matter. She does
not treat the successor's knowledge as immaterial; in fact, the second owner's
awareness of the intervening change in law should figure heavily in a court's
decision. "The more difficult question is what role the temporal relationship
between regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper Penn
Centralanalysis."'" Speaking directly to Justice Scalia, she notes, "Indeed,
it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings
inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance."62
The most critical passage of Justice O'Connor's opinion, which Justice
Stevens will echo in his opinion for the Court in Tahoe-Sierra,elaborates on
this point. "Under [Penn Centraland other relevant] cases, interference with
investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must
examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant
acquires the property at issue helps shape the reasonableness of those
expectations."6 3 In summary, she observes,
[O]ur decision today does not remove the regulatory backdrop against which
an owner takes title to property from the purview of the Penn Central
inquiry. It simply restores balance to that inquiry. Courts properly consider
the effect of existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed
expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred.'
Justice O'Connor is the member of the majority who accords the most
significance to the successor's knowledge of the change in the law, a fact that
places her squarely in the center of the Court.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, would have
rejected Palazzolo's claim on ripeness grounds, thereby obviating the need for
any discussion of the merits of the notice rule issue. The final footnote of her
60. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She also notes, "Evaluation of the degree
of interference with investment-backed expectations instead is one factor that points toward the
answer to the question whether the application of a particular regulation to particular property
'goes too far."' Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922)).
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concurrence, however, suggests how these three members of the Court might
have ruled had they reached this issue. In this footnote, she remarks, "If
Palazzolo's claim were ripe and the merits properly presented, I would, at a
minimum, agree with Justice O'Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer
that transfer of title can impair a takings claim." 5 The fact that these Justices
view an owner's notice of existing land-use restrictions as relevant distances
them from Justice Scalia, and the "at a minimum" language implies that they
might see this factor as being even more significant than Justice O'Connor
does.
Justice Breyer also wrote separately to underscore this point. He supports
Justice O'Connor's view that the successor's knowledge of the law may be
relevant but that its importance will vary from case to case, noting that "much
depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of
ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might
otherwise exist."66 Justice Breyer provides additional specificity by noting
that prior knowledge of a limiting law is a factor that will matter greatly when
a court must evaluate an owner's expectations as one of the Penn Central
factors. "Ordinarily, such expectations will diminish in force and
significance-rapidly and dramatically-as property continues to change
hands over time." 7 However, this knowledge does not rise to the level of a
categorical bar to the successor's claim, for "I believe that such factors can
adequately be taken into account within the Penn Centralframework." ' 8
Justice Stevens provides the fifth vote for the view that prior knowledge
of existing law is an important factor in any takings claim alleging impairment
of the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. If anything, he
appears to go further than the four other Justices with whom he is in general
agreement, and he serves as a partial counterweight to Justice Scalia on this
point. Justice Stevens notes that a rule allowing the owner to convey a claim
to a successor "admits of no obvious limiting principle. If the existence of
valid land-use regulations does not limit the title that the first postenactment
purchaser of the property inherits, then there is no reason why such
regulations should limit the rights of the second, the third, or the thirtieth
purchaser." ' 9 But a complete counterweight to Justice Scalia would view the
successor's knowledge as an absolute bar to her claim, and Justice Stevens
65. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Recall that the Court remanded Palazzolo on the Penn
Central question.

69. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissentingin part); see also Rith Energy,
Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting an argument raised in the
claimant's brief that the claimant may ."stand in the shoes of its predecessors who owned before
[the statute became effective]"'), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002); cf United States v. Land,
213 F.3d 830, 836-37 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing similar questions in the context of a valuation
proceeding).
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will not go quite this far in the opposite direction: "I would treat the owners'
notice as relevant to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,'
but not necessarily dispositive."'7
At least seven members of the Court rejected a rule that would have
completely barred Palazzolo, who obtained title to property after its use was
restricted, from bringing a takings claim.7 ' At least five members of the
Court, however, authored or joined additional opinions to emphasize their
view that this fact is pertinent-and to some of the five very pertinent-to the
strength of the successor owner's claim.' Palazzolo'sfacts did not permit the
Justices to explore this question further, but the next Section takes that
liberty. 73
C. How Palazzolo Affects Different Types of Regulatory Takings Claims
Close analysis of the Court's six opinions indicates that the Justices
distinguished between two groups of takings cases located at opposite ends of
the takings continuum. On the one hand, the owner who suffers a direct
condemnation or an inverse physical taking should not be permitted to transfer
his claim to a successor owner.74 The taking has occurred in its entirety, the
owner at the time of the taking is identifiable and has a ripe claim,75 and that
claim belongs to the original owner and may not be transferred. On the other
hand, the owner whose land is subjected to a new or enhanced restriction on
its use is not categorically barred from transferring that claim to a successor
owner. An outright prohibition on transfer in this context might unfairly
allow the government to escape liability because of a fortuitous sale by a
predecessor owner who never ripened his case. This would leave the

70. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. The five members of the majority unquestionably share this view. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion leaves open the possibility that the successor owner's knowledge should categorically
preclude a claim. Justices Souter and Breyer joined her opinion, but the separate opinions of
Justices Stevens and Breyer would treat the successor's knowledge as important but not
dispositive. So Justices Ginsburg and Souter might treat the successor's knowledge as
conclusive, while the other seven Justices state explicitly that they would not.
72. Justice Scalia took a directly contrary view, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas are silent on this point.
73. Justice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence implied that he generally agrees with this
argument. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that "the test must be whether [a] deprivation is contrary to reasonable,
investment-backed expectations" and adding that "courts must consider all reasonable
expectations whatever their source"). However, he did not address this point any further in
Palazzolo.
74. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
75. Or, in the case of a direct condemnation, this owner is the defendant in a claim already
brought by the government, as plaintiff.
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successor owner with restricted land but no viable takings claim.76
Because Palazzolo's petition did not raise the issue, the Court's analysis
prudently avoids distinguishing among the different types of inverse
regulatory takings claims. The analysis that follows here will demonstrate
that these different types of claims merit different treatment and it will
describe that treatment. This analysis draws heavily from the six disparate
Palazzoloopinions. Based on the direct statements the Justices made and the
implications of their opinions, this Section will show that owners with most
types of inverse regulatory takings claims should be prohibited from
transferring their claims to a successor. Only in one narrow category of cases
should the second owner succeed to the takings claim as well as to title.
This Section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection builds
on Palazzolo's examination of direct takings and inverse physical takings to
illustrate that there actually are six different types of takings claims. The
second subsection demonstrates that five of these six types of claims merit
similar treatment. In all five of these variants, only the owner at the time of
the taking should be permitted to seek just compensation. The third and last
subsection contrasts the sixth type of regulatory takings claim and explains
why in this type of case alone the successor owner should be allowed to
pursue takings compensation. Palazzolothus intimates that just one narrow
category of successor owner should be permitted to bring a case when she
acquires title after a change in the law limiting her use of her property.
1. The Six Different Types of Takings Claims
The Court's opinion in Palazzolo states that successors to owners who
suffer direct condemnations or inverse physical takings may not bring claims
of their own; only the owner at the time of the taking may pursue just
compensation.77 Takings cases fall on a spectrum, with these two types of
claims located at one end. This subsection will review these two types of
cases and describe the other four. The next two subsections will demonstrate
that five of these six types of claims merit identical treatment.
The previous Section described the two least complicated types of takings
claims in the context of the Palazzolo Court's analysis.78 In many important
ways, these two settings are comparable.79 In both types, there is a single
critical factual event, and often it is undisputed: The government either
initiates a lawsuit or physically occupies an owner's property at some moment

76. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 49.
78. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
79. These two types of cases also differ in some key ways. Most importantly, the
government isthe initiating party inadirect condemnation, while the landowner is the plaintiff
inan inverse physical taking. See supra notes 41,45 and accompanying text.
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in time."° At that moment, the alleged taking occurs and several important
facts of the case crystallize. That date establishes the identity of the
landowner at the time of the taking, ripens the case,"' sets the date on which
the property must be valued82 and on which any post-taking interest will begin
to accrue, and commences the running of the statute of limitations. The
parties may disagree as to whether or not there is a public use' and as to the
amount of compensation, but all the critical facts of the case gel at the precise
moment of the taking." As the PalazzoloCourt succinctly noted, the moment
the government takes the property directly or by physical occupation, "the fact
and extent of the taking are known."85
These first two types of takings cases are easy to recognize because the
government either initiates legal proceedings or physically occupies the
property.86 The cases become more difficult when neither of these easily-

80. In an inverse physical taking case, it is the government's intrusion onto the property
that effects the taking. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958) (holding that the taking
occurred when the government entered into possession of the land, not when it filed its
declaration of taking three years later). Even in a relatively straightforward case of this type,
complexities may arise. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1947)
(identifying the time of the taking in a case in which government action led to gradual flooding
of the property). Both cases are discussed at infra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
81. The landowner who brings an inverse physical claim may need to seek compensation
at the state level before the claim is ripe. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text
(discussing ripeness generally); cf infra note 121 (questioning whether a plaintiff with a facial
claim must seek compensation before the claim is ripe).
82. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
320 (1987) (noting the "unexceptional proposition" that property is valued at the time of the
taking).
83. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1984) (rejecting a
public use challenge to a takings claim); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,35-36 (1954) (rejecting
a similar public use challenge).
84. See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LANDUSE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 164-65 (1999) (listing and discussing
reasons why defining the effective moment of a taking with precision is essential); Gregory M.
Stein, Pinpointingthe Beginningand Endingof a Temporary Regulatory Taking, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 953, 960-61 (1995) (discussing the effective moment of a taking); see also Kirby Forest
Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9-15 (1980) (addressing some of the reasons why
pinpointing the effective date of a taking is important); Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365,
1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the effective date of a taking); Banks v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 806, 825-26 (2001) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the
takings claim accrues).
85. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
86. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1479
(2002) (referring to physical takings cases as "easily identified"); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617
(referring to physical takings cases as "[t]he clearest sort of taking"); United States v. Sec.
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1982) (referring to a case in which the government acquired
property for itself as "a classical 'taking").
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observed events occurs. A government body instead may attempt to regulate
the use of property without physically encroaching on it. If the owner suffers
a severe impact, she may argue that the government's action effectively
deprives her of property without compensation. The remaining types of
takings all fall within this broad category of inverse regulatorytakings.
In the third type of claim--a facial inverse regulatory taking-the
property owner alleges that the mere existence of a land-use control takes
property.8 7 This third type of taking is somewhat more difficult to discern.
Its unique feature is that all possible applications of the challenged law merit
compensation. The judicial inquiry focuses on the intrusiveness of the law
itself and not on the owner's particular plans for the land. 8 The taking, if
there is one, occurs the moment the law becomes effective.8 9
The final three types of claims are even more difficult to recognize and
more fact-specific. These claims are all as-appliedinverse regulatory takings
claims, meaning that the law or regulation generally is acceptable but that it
takes property in a particular case because of its effect as applied to the
owner's land." Typically, a regulation will place restrictions on land that
impair the owner's use without depriving the owner of that use entirely. The
burden then shifts to the owner to apply for a permit for a specific use of that
property and to determine whether the appropriate regulatory agency grants
the application. 9' The fact that the government body rejects the request does
not necessarily imply that there is no possible use for the property: The owner
may have to submit a less intensive proposal to learn whether the agency will
87. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494-95
(1987) (distinguishing between facial and as-applied claims); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of
Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1163-66 (4th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing between facial and as-applied
claims).
88. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478-80 (highlighting the distinction between
physical and regulatory takings and rejecting the use of physical takings cases as controlling
precedent in regulatory takings cases).
89. Facial takings are not common, and cases alleging a facial taking usually fail. See,
e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (referring to the "uphill battle" landowners with facial takings
claims confront); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296-97
(1981) (rejecting a facial claim). After discussing Keystone, the Tahoe-Sierra Court referred
to the petitioners' uphill battle as "especially steep." Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1477.
90. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494 (1987) (distinguishing between facial and as-applied
claims). As-applied claims are far more common than facial claims, with government entities
passing a wide range of laws and regulations designed for application in many different
circumstances. Landowners then come up with different plans for different parcels of land, and
government bodies must apply the laws to these parcels in site-specific ways. Government
entities are wary ofenacting broad laws that might work facial takings because of the enormous
municipal liability that can result. Thus, most inverse takings claims today are as-applied
claims.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
(observing that, "after all, the very existence of a permit systen implies that permission may be
granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired").
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approve a more modest use. Finally, the owner cannot claim in federal court
that she has been deprived of a constitutional right until an appropriate state
forum rejects her claim for compensation. 9
The Supreme Court has developed a complex, two-pronged ripeness
requirement reflecting the high degree of discretion that government
regulators exercise throughout the permitting process. An unhappy property
owner will fail if all she does is file suit in federal court seeking
compensation. She first must submit an application to the appropriate state
or lotal authority, such as a building department or environmental review
board. If this authority rejects her application, she may have to seek a
variance or take other action to ensure that the authority's denial is
administratively final. 9" Moreover, if her rejected proposal is considered
"grandiose," then a single denial is insufficient to establish whether she might
receive approval for a more modest proposal, and she will have to re-apply at
least ofice more.94 She does not meet the first requirement for ripening her
claim until she receives a final rejection of a proposal that is not excessive.9 5
The dissatisfied landowner next must pursue whatever remedial procedures
her state provides and must seek the just compensation to which she believes
she is constitutionally entitled." This is because the Fifth Amendment
prohibits only uncompensated takings, and if she has not sought
compensation, she does not yet know if her constitutional rights have been
violated. 97 Her federal takings claim is not ripe, and she may not enter federal
court, until she takes this second step and the state denies just compensation.
Meeting the Court's ripeness requirements is difficult, expensive, and
time-consuming. This is because the Court recognizes that a federal claim
does not exist until an alleged taking goes uncompensated at the state level,

92. Williamson County Reg'I Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985). See generally Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness
in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1,21-22 (1995) [hereinafter Stein, Regulatory Takings
and Ripeness] (discussing the elements of the ripeness test).
93. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191 (noting that a federal court cannot assess the
merits of a claim "until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question").
94. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53, 353 n.9
(1986); cf Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 619 (2001) (observing that additional
applications are unnecessary when "the unequivocal nature of the . . . regulations" and "the
...application of the regulations to the subject property" suggest that such attempts would be
fruitless).
95. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-42 (1997); Williamson
County, 473 U.S. at 186-94 (1985).
96. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733-34; Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-97.
97. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause has been held
applicable to the states. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 235-41 (1897).
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and an owner cannot seek compensation in a state forum until the appropriate
permitting authority has demonstrated with specificity and finality just how
it will apply the law to the land. Ripeness, then, is at least partly a
jurisdictional prerequisite to any federal takings claim.9" It also makes great
sense prudentially, for it allows a federal court to defer mastering the
intricacies of local land-use laws until local authorities employ their greater
expertise to determine whether the proposal is acceptable under those laws.99
This two-pronged federal ripeness test applies to the three remaining types
of takings claims. In fact, these three types of as-applied claims differ only
in the extent to which the owner has ripened them. In some cases, the owner
will have ripened the claim, and a ripe inverse regulatory taking represents the
fourth type of takings claim. In other cases, the owner will be only partway
through the process of ripening her claim: She will have obtained a final
decision at the state level but will not yet have finished pursuing
compensation. This fifth type of takings claim, then, is one that is unripe
under the compensation prong of federal ripeness requirements. Finally, an
owner may not even be this far along in the process; indeed, she may not yet
have proposed a use for her property. This sixth and last type of takings claim
is one that is unripe under the final decision prong of federal ripeness
requirements.
In sum, there are six types of takings claims: (1) the direct condemnation;
(2) the inverse physical taking; (3) the facial inverse regulatory taking; (4) the
ripe as-applied inverse regulatory taking; (5) the as-applied inverse regulatory
taking that is unripe under the compensation prong; and (6) the as-applied
inverse regulatory taking that is unripe under the finality prong." This

98. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7 (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43,
57 n. 18 (1993) and discussing the Article III attributes of ripeness); Stein, Regulatory Takings
and Ripeness, supra note 92, at 11-14 (same).
99. "[I]t is the interest in informed decisionmaking that underlies our decisions imposing
a strict ripeness requirement on landowners asserting regulatory takings claims." Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1488 (2002); see also Cienega
Gardens v. United States, 265 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing the
requirement emphasized by the Palazzolo Court that local land-use authorities must first
ascertain the effect of applicable laws); Seventh Regiment Fund v. Pataki, 179 F. Supp. 2d 356,
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasizing that local land-use authorities must first ascertain the effect
of applicable laws).
100. The boundaries separating the six types of takings claims are not always as clear as
this discussion may imply. A plaintiff may bring both facial and as-applied claims, out of the
concern that a court will not agree with her own view as to whether a law barred all use of the
property or permitted the owner to seek consent from a regulatory body. Similarly, a regulatory
agency may argue that a claim ripened long ago so that it can raise a statute of limitations
defense, while a landowner may believe that the agency retained the discretion to grant a permit,
thereby deferring the date on which the statute of limitations began to run. The courts will have
to clarify the locations of these boundaries as the inevitable cases arise. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellees at 28-41, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency (9th Cir. 2001)
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terminology is exceedingly complex but is necessary to distinguish among the
different factual settings in which these cases arise. This complex
terminology also highlights the difficult challenges judges-many of whom
are not experts in land-use law-face when they must keep the different types
of cases separate in their minds. Subsection 2 aims to reduce this complexity
by demonstrating that five of these six types of claims merit similar treatment
in notice-rule cases. Subsection 3 distinguishes the sixth type of takings claim
and illustrates how Palazzolo leads to different treatment for the landowner
who falls into this sixth category.
2. In Five of These Types of Takings Claims, Knowledge of Existing Laws
Should Bar Claims by Successor Owners
The previous subsection described the six different types of takings claims
that can arise, ranging from a straightforward direct condemnation all the way
through an inverse regulatory takings claim that is unripe under the finality
prong. This subsection will examine the first five of these varieties of takings
claims and will demonstrate that all five are alike in an important respect: The
facts of the case are fully developed in all five of these settings and any taking
is fully crystallized. As a result, in all five of these scenarios, the owner who
acquires property with notice of an existing restriction on the use of the land
should be barred from bringing a takings claim."0 The Palazzolo Court
reached this conclusion with regard to the first two of these types of claims,
but the Court's reasoning logically should apply with equal force to three of
the remaining four types of claims."°
The Court refused to bar Palazzolo's claim categorically and distinguished
the facts of his case from a direct condemnation, which "presents different

(No. 00-16660) (arguing that the agency's failure to reverse an action it was not required to
reverse could not restart a statute of limitations period that had already begun to run).
101. This Section discusses the six different types of takings claims for purposes of
examining the ways in which the notice rule should be applied in each of them. This survey is
not meant to suggest that courts should apply the same substantive takings analysis in the six
different types of claims, or in five of the six types. A form of substantive analysis that is
entirely fitting when the government has physically occupied property may be inappropriate in
an as-applied regulatory takings case. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Do PartialRegulatory
Takings Exist?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBUC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 219,
239 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) [hereinafter TAKINGSIDES] (noting that "the Supreme Court
has never suggested that the Takings Clause applies in interchangeable fashion to use
restrictions and to physical occupations'); Daniel P. Selmi, MoratoriaandCategoricalTakings,
in id. at 307, 315-16 (distinguishing between physical occupations and temporary planning
moratoria).
102. The material in this subsection and the next expands on ideas I first developed in a
chapter published shortly after the Court decided Palazzolo. GREGORY M. STEIN, The Effect
of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on the Role ofReasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, in
TAKING SIDES, supranote 101, at 41.
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considerations than cases alleging a taking based on a burdensome
regulation."' 3 The basis for this distinction is that "[iln a direct
condemnation action, or when a State has physically invaded the property
without filing suit, the fact and extent of the taking are known."'" In these
settings, the facts are fully settled as soon as the government initiates the
direct condemnation or invades the owner's property.0 Once this taking
occurs, the owner at the time of the taking is easy to identify, and the relevant
facts have occurred and are easily established in a judicial setting."° "In such
an instance, it is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any award
goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and that the right to compensation
is not passed to a subsequent purchaser."'0 7
Interestingly, the Court cited Danforth v. United States"8 for the
proposition that a takings claim of this type may not be transferred after the
taking has occurred, but Danforth was a case that arose under federal law.
Takings claims may not be assigned under federal law, as Congress made
clear long ago when it adopted the federal Anti-Assignment Act"°9 and as the
Supreme Court later confirmed in UnitedStates v. Dow."' Palazzolo argued,

103. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
104. Id.
105. Conversely, when these facts are not settled, the owner may, and probably must, wait
to bring a claim. See Dickinson v. United States, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947) (contrasting
"stabilized" claims that have "so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck" with
"a continuing process of physical events" in which "the owner is not required to resort either
to piecemeal or to premature litigation').
106. See supranotes 41-49 and accompanying text; cf Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 749 (noting
that "there is nothing in legal doctrine[] to preclude ... postponing suit until the situation
becomes stabilized"). See generally Bolingv. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370-73 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (summarizing the difficulties in determining the accrual date of a takings claim arising
from erosion caused by the government).
107. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; see also United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958);
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939); infra notes 108-17 and accompanying
text.
108. 308 U.S. at 284, cited in Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1994); see infra note 113.
110. 357 U.S. 17, 20 (1958) (holding that "the Assignment of Claims Act prohibits the
voluntary assignment of a compensation claim against the Government for the taking of
property.... Accordingly, Dow can prevail only if the 'taking' occurred while he was the
owner") (citation omitted); see also Kindred v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582,597 (1912)
(holding that if a railroad with condemnation power legally occupies an owner's land, "a
subsequent vendee of the owner takes the land subject to the burden of the right of way, and the
right to exact payment therefor from the railroad company belongs to the owner at the time the
company entered and constructed the road"); Roberts v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 158 U.S. 1, 10 (1895)
(noting that when a railroad with the power of eminent domain "has entered into actual
possession of land.. . , a subsequent vendee ... takes the land subject to the burthen of the
railroad, and the right to payment. . . belongs to the owner at the time the railroad company
took possession").
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however, that the State of Rhode Island had taken his land by applying state
law. One possible reading of Palazzolois that the Court meant to clarify that
the rules of Danforth and Dow apply to cases alleging Fifth Amendment
takings by states and their subdivisions applying state or local law, although
this might raise some problematic federalism issues."' Under this reading, the
holder of a crystallized claim, such as the actual claim in Dow or the direct
and inverse physical claims described in Palazzolo, would not be able to
transfer his Fifth Amendment claim to a successor owner even if the alleged
taking was perpetrated by a state acting under state law. If this is not what the
Palazzolo Court intended, then the question of transferability remains a
question of state law, and the Court simply assumed that Rhode Island law
comports with federal law on this point. Many states do appear to bar the
transfer of accrued takings claims under their own laws, "2 but it is possible
that some states might permit the type ofpost-accrual transfer thatDow rejects
under federal law. States, however, tend to frown upon transfers of claims,
and the reasoning of Palazzolo supports this hesitancy." 3

Ill. The Court also might hold that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides compensation only to the owner at the time of the taking, but that "time of the taking"
is to be established under state law. Such a result would appear to comport with principles of
federalism. Note also that the Court seemed unconcerned about federalism questions elsewhere
in Palazzolo. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
112. In Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994), the landowners brought an asapplied challenge to a statute that prohibited them from disturbing a Native American burial
mound they discovered on their property. The court rejected their claim, noting that the relevant
statutes:
were in existence and therefore part of Iowa's property law some ten years before the
plaintiffs purchased the land in question. So the "bundle of rights" the plaintiffs acquired
by their fee simple title did not include the right to use the land contrary to the provisions
of those three Iowa Code sections. Any prohibited use of lot 15 is directly attributable to
the provisions of these three Code sections. The plaintiffs took title to the land in question
subject to the provisions of these sections. These sections and their resulting prohibitions
concerning the use of land ran-so to speak-with the land.
Id. at 371. For other cases reaching similar results, see Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?,
supra note 16, at 91 n. 12.
113. See JuLIus L. SACKMAN, 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.01 [5][d][i] (3d ed.
1998) (noting that "[i]t is well settled that when there is a taking of property by eminent domain
in compliance with law, it is the owner of the property at the time of the taking who is entitled
to compensation" and citing to numerous state and federal cases), cited by Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001); SACKMAN, supra, at § 5.02[3] (noting that, with some
exceptions, "the right to compensation... does not run with the land but remains a personal
claim in the hands of the vendor"). But see id. at § 5.02 [3][c] (noting that, while "an award [of
takings compensation] is personal property and will not pass to another," it may be "specifically
assigned"). This analysis suggests that a bare deed will not transfer a crystallized takings claim
to a successor owner of the property but that an express assignment might effect such a
transfer-or at least a transfer of a takings award-in some states.

20021

TAKINGS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Palazzolo confirms that if an owner suffers a direct condemnation or an
inverse physical taking and elects to transfer his now-devalued property
before receiving compensation, he remains entitled to the entire compensation
award and his successor receives no portion of the award."' The parties
should factor the potential for an award into their respective valuations of the
property,"' and the successor should offer a price that reflects her estimate of
the value of the estate that is left after the taking." 6 Any residual uncertainty
can be handled through the use of options, closing conditions, 7post-closing
reimbursement and indemnification obligations, and escrows."1
The Court has recognized a wide range of reasons why it is desirable to prohibit the
assignment of claims. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. There is another reason to
discourage assignments of claims: The assignor and assignee may have to cooperate for the
claim to proceed, but their interests after the property transfer may be adverse and their
relationship may be hostile. See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 154-61
(discussing problems of proof).
Perhaps courts need to distinguish between an assignment of the claim and an assigfiment of
the right to any compensation. In the latter case, the original owner retains and pursues the
claim and then assigns the award to the successor. The federal Anti-Assignment Act, for
instance, states that "[ain assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of
the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued." 31 U.S.C. §
3727(b) (1994). See supra note 43 (addressing the issue of champerty); cf Rockafellor v. Gray,
191 N.W. 107, 108 (Iowa 1922) (holding, reluctantly, that a claim arising from a breach of the
covenant of seisin runs with land, while noting that most states reach the opposite result).
114. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; see also Dow v. United States, 357 U.S. 17, 27 (1958)
(rejecting a claim by a successor owner who obtained title after the government took physical
possession of property).
115. Other questions also may be unsettled. For example, the parties may disagree as to
whether a physical invasion is permanent enough to rise to the level of a taking. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947) (holding that when the government
constructs a dam that floods property, a taking does not occur and the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the flooding stabilizes); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945) (providing compensation for a temporary taking of a leasehold interest); Danforth v.
United States, 308 U.S. 271, 286-87 (1939) (rejecting an owner's claim because the intrusion
was only "incidental"); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (distinguishing between temporary physical invasions and permanent physical
occupations). For consistent applications of the Dickinson rule leading to contrary results,
compare Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a successor
owner may maintain a takings claim because the predecessor transferred property before flood
damage to timber had stabilized) with Banks v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 806, 825-26 (2001)
(barring a claim by the successor owner because the successor acquired property after erosion
damage had stabilized).
116. See, e.g., Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 384 (9th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing this fact in the context of applying the rule of Palazzolo); Banks, 49 Fed. Cl. at
825-26 (holding that parties who acquired land after government-caused erosion had stabilized
could not assert takings claims arising from this erosion and that predecessor owners' claims
were barred by the statute of limitations).
117. See Dow, 357 U.S. at 27 (noting contractual methods of allocating risk between the
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The Court's unequivocal statements here and the lack of uncertainty in
the underlying law explain why most of the Court's attention to the notice
rule-and to reasonable investment-backed expectations more generally-has
arisen in the context of inverse regulatory takings. When it comes to direct
condemnations and inverse physical takings, the law is firmly fixed and all
parties are acting against a background of established law." 8 Even if a court
were to apply Penn Central's expectations analysis more thoroughly to a case
of one of these types, the parties' expectations are well settled by the case law,
and the application of Penn Central'smore flexible approach would not lead
to different results.
The Palazzolo Court did not expressly address facial inverse regulatory
takings, but the language of the opinion suggests that the same type of analysis
should apply to this third type of takings claim. The major contrast the
Palazzolo opinion draws is between cases in which the facts have finished
developing and cases in which a government body has yet to decide how it
will exercise its discretion in applying a land-use law. Thus, "[iln a direct
condemnation action, or when a State has physically invaded the property
without filing suit, the fact and extent of the taking are known,"" '9 and any
takings claim remains with the original owner. In contrast, when the plaintiff
raises "[a] challenge to the application of a land-use regulation, . . . [the
claim] does not mature until ripeness requirements have been satisfied."' 2
Because a facial taking-like a direct condemnation or an inverse physical
occupation-is a one-time event and not an ongoing process,' 2 ' the opinion
suggests that facial claims also remain with the original owner, even if he
transfers the property after the new law becomes effective. All three of these
"instantaneous" takings should be treated in a similar way, a fact that
Palazzolo does not change. 2 Judicial treatment of facial inverse takings is

owner at the time of a physical taking and the successor who owned property at the time
government liability was established); cf E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 516 (1998)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the allocation of liability for employee benefits between original
and successor business entities).
118. See, e.g., Kim v. City ofNew York, 681 N.E.2d 312,316-19 (N.Y. 1997) (describing
established principles of state law in a case involving physical occupation of property).
119. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. If the owner's claim is against a state
or local government entity, he will still have to ripen his claim by seeking compensation in the
appropriate state forum. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686 (9th Cir.
1993) (excusing a plaintiff from meeting the compensation prong only because the applicable
state procedures did not exist at the relevant time); supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text
(discussing ripeness). But see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,736 n. 10
(1997) (stating that facial claims become ripe upon the enactment of offending legislation,
without mentioning the need to seek compensation).
122. Justice Stevens's opinion in Palazzolo demonstrates that he thought the petitioner was
raising a facial claim, although he would have found for the respondent on the merits.

2002]

TAKINGS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

915

well settled, and the reasonable investment-backed expectations ofbuyers and
sellers should include this settled law.'23
Application of the notice rule becomes more complicated when the claim
is as-applied rather than facial. The fourth type of claim this subsection
examines is the ripe as-applied inverse regulatory taking. If an owner ripens
a federal takings claim and then transfers the property to a successor without
first bringing his ripe claim to judgment, the question becomes whether the
new owner succeeds to the original owner's right to seek compensation. 24
Although Palazzolo does not address this question directly, the Court's
reasoning strongly suggests that only the original owner may bring this claim.
The Court's opinion distinguishes between two groups of cases, stating that
the holder of a claim falling within the first group may not transfer it. This
first group of cases expressly includes "[d]irect condemnation, by invocation
of the State's power of eminent domain," and cases in which "a State has
physically invaded the property without filing suit. .. .12

In cases such as

these, "any award goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and.., the right
to compensation is not passed to a subsequent purchaser."' 26 Facial inverse
regulatory takings logically appear to fall within this group as well.' 27 In all
three of these settings, the facts are fully developed, the government either has
taken property or it has not, and post-transfer events will not affect the merits
of the claim. 28 The only open questions-whether the owner will recover and
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
"[t]he most natural reading of petitioner's complaint is that the regulations in and of themselves
precluded him from filling the wetlands, and that their adoption therefore constituted the alleged
taking"); see also supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Levald, 998 F.2d at 686-89 (concluding that a facial claim accrues when the
ordinance is enacted and that the statute of limitations runs from that date); Nat'l Adver. Co.
v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that an ordinance banning
billboards effected a taking upon its enactment and that the statute of limitations began to run
on that date); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 808 F.Supp. 1474,
1480 (D. Nev. 1992) (noting that "[a] facial takings claim based upon Ordinance 81-5 became
actionable upon the date that TRPA took final action to enact the ordinance. There is no reason
for the plaintiffs' delay in alleging a regulatory taking as a result of this Ordinance"), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 34 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994); cf.Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 801
F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) (applying a similar approach to the statute of
limitations in an as-applied claim and finding the claim not time-barred because the plaintiffdid
not have the right to enforce the claim until after the county reached its final decision).
124. For example, imagine an owner who acquires property before the government imposes
a land-use restriction. The owner applies for a permit to develop the property, and all of his
requests are finally rejected. The owner is then denied compensation at the state level.
Although he has ripened his federal claim, he transfers the property to anew owner rather than
pursuing this ripe claim.
125. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
126. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
127. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
128. See SACKMAN, supra note 113, at § 5.02[3] (distinguishing between claims that arise
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how much-are for the federal court. 129
Ripe as-applied inverse regulatory takings exhibit all of these
characteristics, and this fourth type of takings claim should be treated in the
same way as the first three. In holding that Palazzolo's possible future claim,
which was unripe when he acquired the property, is not categorically barred
by his knowledge of existing restrictions, the Court noted that "[a] challenge
to the application of a land-use regulation.., does not mature until ripeness
requirements have been satisfied . . . ; until this point an inverse
condemnation claim alleging a regulatory taking cannot be maintained."' 30
SGI, Palazzolo's predecessor-in-title, had not ripened a takings claim and
could not have maintained a federal action, or even an action in a state forum,
at any point during its ownership."' Since SGI could not have brought a
claim, it would be unfair to Palazzolo-and might
unjustifiably enrich the
32
state-to bar Palazzolo from bringing a claim.
If SGI had ripened its federal claim before Palazzolo acquired the land,
however, SGI could have brought this claim itself. The Court's distinction
between direct condemnations or inverse physical invasions, in which "the
fact and extent of the taking are known,"' 33 and as-applied challenges, in
which the claim "does not mature until ripeness requirements have been
satisfied,"' 34 strongly suggests that Palazzolo could not have brought the claim
if SGI had already ripened it.' If SGI had ripened its case, it would possess
a mature claim, just as if the state had condemned its property directly or
taken it inversely by physical occupation. The original owner would be able

when land is sold either before or after a portion of it has been taken).
129. If the original owner has not yet sought takings compensation for an inverse taking
in the appropriate state forum, then her federal claim is not yet ripe. Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985); see supra
notes 96-97 and accompanying text. However, the state-level claim for compensation becomes
ripe upon receipt of a final decision, see infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text, and the
landowner is entitled to seek compensation from the state in the state's designated forum.
130. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
13 1. The Court expressed concerns about the "quixotic" effect of the notice rule on older
owners or owners who lack the resources to retain their property. Id.; cf infra notes 160-63 and
accompanying text (discussing involuntary transfers).
132. "It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the
post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not
taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; cf
Banks v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 806,825-26 (2001) (recognizing that asuccessor owner may
not assert a ripe regulatory takings claim that already accrued to the prior owner).
133. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
134. Id.; see also Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir.
1986) (Kennedy, J.) (noting the connection between the date on which the plaintiffreceives the
final decision and the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run).
135. See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 109-12 (suggesting that
ripe as-applied claims, like facial claims, should not be transferable).
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to maintain this claim, which means that the claim should not be transferable.
Palazzolothus implies that a successor owner cannot bring an inverse takings
claim if the predecessor's as-applied claim was ripe at the time of the
transfer.' 36
Palazzolo sensibly implies that ripe as-applied inverse claims should be
treated in the same way as facial inverse claims, inverse physical claims, and
direct condemnations. A property owner who also possesses a ripe as-applied
inverse takings claim cannot transfer that claim to a successor owner, and no
successor owner can reasonably expect that she will succeed to her
predecessor's claim. The successor acquires only the property and not her
predecessor's right to seek takings compensation in federal court.
The analysis becomes murkier still when the claim is both as-applied and
unripe when the original owner transfers the property. In cases of this type,
there are two reasons why the claim may be unripe, with each reason leading
to a different result. A claim may be unripe because the property owner has
not obtained a final administrative decision. Alternatively, the owner may
have cleared this first hurdle but may not have finished pursuing just
compensation at the state level. ' This latter type of claim is unripe under the
compensation prong, and it illustrates the fifth type of takings claim. Just as
with the third and fourth types of claims, Palazzolo's reasoning implies that
only the original owner may bring a takings claim and that the successor
owner may not.
Palazzolo unquestionably bars the transfer of claims arising from direct
takings and inverse physical takings. Its reasoning strongly suggests that it
also bars the transfer of facial claims and ripe as-applied claims. In all four
of these cases, the common feature is that the facts of the claim are finalized
before the original owner transfers the property. The original owner may wish
to convey both the restricted property and the ripe lawsuit, but only the first
of these two assets is transferable. If, however, the original owner's federal
claim is unripe solely because the state has not yet decided whether he
deserves compensation, then his state claim is ripe. The second prong of
federal ripeness requirements demands that the property owner pursue just
compensation at the state level. The fact that a state forum is willing to
consider the compensation issue indicates that the claimant must have reached
administrative finality. In other words, state ripeness requirements coincide
with only the first of the two federal ripeness prongs.' A federal court can

136. Cf supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing the similar rule in the
context of direct takings and inverse physical takings).
137. More precisely, the property owner must submit an application to the relevant
regulatory agency and have it rejected, must pursue this application to finality, and, if the
proposal is grandiose, may need to re-apply one or more times and receive final denials of those
applications as well. The owner next must be denied just compensation in the appropriate state
forum. See generally supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
138. The state taking becomes effective-and the state claim ripens-when the state-level
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require that the plaintiff first seek compensation unsuccessfully in a state
forum, but that same state forum cannot require a prior rejection from itself
as a prerequisite to its own jurisdiction." 9 Of course, if the state forum
decides that the claim is not yet factually mature, which is to say that the
plaintiff has also failed to meet the first federal ripeness prong, then the claim
falls into the sixth category, which the next subsection addresses. In that
instance, even the state claim is unripe.
Thus, if the claim is unripe only because the plaintiff has not yet finished
pursuing compensation -at the state level, then the claim is completely
developed factually. The owner has received a final decision, even though the
federal claim remains unripe for a separate reason. The state claim is ripe,
and Palazzolo suggests that ripe claims arising from final decisions are not
transferable. "[T]he fact and extent of the taking are known,"'" and the only
question that remains to be answered is whether a tribunal at either the state
or federal level will view this complete set of events as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Both state and federal ripeness standards demand administrative
finality, and this fifth type of claim is administratively final.
For purposes of applying the notice rule, this fifth category of takings
claims seems no different from the first four, a fact that Palazzolo appears not
to affect. If the owner's claim is unripe solely under the compensation prong
of federal ripeness standards, the claim remains with the original owner even
if he transfers the property to a successor. 4' Viewed from the successor's
perspective, if a person is considering acquiring property from an owner who
possesses a takings claim that is unripe solely under the compensation prong,
that successor should factor the effect of the restrictive law into the price she
offers for the property. The original owner may be disappointed at this

administrative authority reaches a final decision. The federal claim does not ripen until the
landowner's pursuit of compensation in state court ends unsuccessfully. See generally Stein,
Regulatory Takings and Ripeness, supra note 92, at 27-29, 36-40 (discussing the effective
moment of state and federal takings).
139. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 320 n. 10 (1987) (noting that "[tfhough, as a matter of law, an illegitimate taking might not
occur until the government refuses to pay, the interference that effects a taking might begin
much earlier, and compensation is measured from that time"); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Note,
The Applicability of Just Compensation to Substantive Due Process Claims, 100 YALE L.J.
2667, 2672 (1991) (stating "[t]he logic of Williamson County would suggest that a property
owner does not have a ripe [federal] takings claim when she enters state proceedings to obtain
just compensation").
140. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
141.

See SACKMAN, supra note 113, at § 5.01 [5][d]. This treatise notes:

if the parcel of land from which the taking is made changes hands after the taking has
occurred but before the compensation has been paid, the right to receive the compensation
does not run with the land, but remains a personal claim ofthe person who was the owner
... at the time of the taking.
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reduced offer, but his consolation, if any, 4will
be found in state or federal
2
court: He retains the unripe takings claim.
3. In the Sixth Type of Takings Claim, Knowledge of Existing Laws
Should Not Bar Claims by Successor Owners.
The sixth type of takings case arises when there is no factual finality. In
this case, the original owner acquires his land before a use restriction becomes
effective and then transfers the property to a successor after that restriction
becomes effective but before receiving a final denial from the appropriate
government entity. The original owner may have been well on his way to
receiving a final decision, he may have requested a permit only recently, or he
may have taken no action at all. For whatever reason, there is no final denial
from the applicable government body. This is the only type of claim that
should be transferable to a successor owner under the reasoning of Palazzolo:
The facts of the case are not fully developed, the claim is not crystallized, and
the "time of the taking" has not yet occurred. This is the only one of the six
types of takings claims in which "an inverse condemnation claim [by the prior
owner] alleging a regulatory taking cannot be maintained."' 4 3 Therefore, it
should be the sole type of case in which a successor can acquire title with
knowledge of a pre-existing restriction without being barred from bringing a
federal takings claim later.'I"
The fact that the successor owner is not completely barred from bringing
this sixth type of claim does not imply that her claim will succeed. The
successor's knowledge of the intervening change remains a factor that the
court must weigh when assessing the merits of her claim, and the various
opinions in Palazzolo reached no consensus on the importance of that

142.

If there has in fact been a taking, the original owner was the owner at "the time of the

taking," Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628, and is the sole party entitled to compensation. He should
be permitted to complete the ripening process by pursuing just compensation at the state level
and then at the federal level even though he recently transferred the property.
143. Id. Recall that even in the fifth type of claim, which is unripe for federal court
purposes under only the compensation prong of ripeness requirements, the original owner does
hold a ripe state takings claim.
This also is the only type of claim in which the regulatory body can still negotiate with the
landowner without fear of temporary takings liability for its past actions. In the first five
settings, the taking, if any, is complete; here, the parties still are developing the facts. See
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (noting that "the
very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted"); cf Franconia
Assocs. v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 1993,2002-04 (2002) (distinguishing between a repudiation
of an agreement, which subsequently can be retracted, and a present breach, which cannot).
144. See, e.g., KCIMgmt., Inc. v. Bd. ofAppeal, 764N.E.2d 377,380-81 (Mass. App. Ct.

2002) (recognizing that the post-enactment buyer is not barred from raising a claim under
Palazzolo and noting that the statute of limitations on an as-applied claim does not begin to run
before the time of the challenged permit application).

TENNESSEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 69:891

factor. 4 When cases turning on this point inevitably arise in the future, the
sequence of events in the permitting and sale process and the precise reasons
why the transferor did not receive a final rejection will be of critical
importance in resolving them. The remainder of this subsection offers
examples of the types of fact patterns likely to favor property owners or
government regulators.
The process of receiving a final denial usually requires the owner to take
a lengthy sequence of steps." s In some cases, the original owner will have
proceeded well down this path. Even though his case technically remains
unripe, a court should impute knowledge of this series of events to the
successor when assessing the reasonableness of her expectations and the
extent to which those expectations are investment-backed. On facts such as
these, it is likely that the successor negotiated for a significant price discount,
reflecting the high likelihood that the request ultimately would be denied. A
court should be wary of ruling in favor of a successor owner who brings a
takings claim on these facts. The owner should reasonably have expected that
this likely denial would become a firm denial, and the price reduction she
received means that any expectations she arguably has are not investmentbacked.' 47

145. After first noting that "[w]e have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law [under the
Lucas nuisance exception] or whether those circumstances are present here," Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 629, the Court concludes that "[t]he claims under the Penn Central [expectations]
analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the case should be remanded," id. at 632. As
previously discussed, the concurring and dissenting Justices express a wide range of views as
to the impact of Palazzolo's knowledge of the intervening change in law. See supranotes 5973 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(observing that "the low price that Rith paid for the leases may well reflect the widely
understood risk that Rith would not be permitted to extract as much coal as it hoped from the
leased properties"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering
the Quark:Investment-BackedExpectationsandEconomically Viable Uses in TakingsAnalysis,
70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 115 (1995) (describing such claims as "ludicrous"). There is an element
of circularity to this argument, of course. See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
If the new owner fails to receive a price reduction--either because she foolishly pays too
much or because she hopes to maximize her chances if she brings a takings claim later on-then
her expectations, though investment-backed, are not reasonable. See Stein, Who Gets the
Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 114-17 (discussing the meaning of "reasonable" and
"investment-backed" in the context of a claim by a buyer who acquires property after an
unfavorable change in the law); see also Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300, 1303
(Mass. 1996) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984), and observing,
before rejecting the landowner's claim, that "[a] property owner's investment-backed
expectations must be reasonable and predicated on existing conditions"). See generally
Michelman, supra note 5, at 1235-45 (discussing the impact of one's prior knowledge of a
disadvantageous change in the law).

20021

TAKINGS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

This type of case falls into the sixth category of takings claims, which
means that Palazzolo does not categorically bar the successor from
proceeding. As sixth-category claims go, however, it is an extremely weak
one, as a majority of the Palazzolo Court recognized. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, notes that "the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant
acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of [that
claimant's] expectations,"' 48 and Justice Breyer, in dissent, states that "much
depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of
ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might
otherwise exist."' 49 Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which was joined by Justices
Souter and Breyer, and Justice Stevens's partial concurrence both express
similar views. 50 Although five members of the Palazzolo Court would allow
a claim with facts such as these to proceed, a different five imply that it will
not succeed.
The seller's claim, on these facts, remains unripe under the finality prong
and not just the compensation prong. The purchaser, meanwhile, knows she
will acquire a claim with only a slight chance of success and therefore
probably places a low value on the claim. The seller, unable to bring his own
claim, sees the market devaluing his property, and he may feel that the deck
is stacked against him. There are two possible ways to protect the seller who
finds himself in this unfortunate situation. One method would require some
judicial creativity. A court might deem the seller's claim ripe because the sale
of the property prevents him from finalizing the claim any further. Rather
than requiring the seller to meet the two traditional ripeness prongs, the court
could instead decide that the sale of the property truncates the ordinary
ripening process and ripens the seller's claim immediately. 5' While no court
appears to have recognized
a sale-ripened takings claim, such an approach
52
seems fair in this setting.

148. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text.
149. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. Ct. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text.
150. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that "[t]he title Palazzolo took by operation of law in 1978 was limited by the
regulations then in place to the extent that such regulations represented a valid exercise of the
police power"); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (agreeing with these three other
opinions on this issue); supra notes 65, 69-70 and accompanying text.
151. See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 130-45 (recommending
that courts adopt this approach).
152. This approach also might satisfy, at least partially, those critics who believe the notice
rule to be unfair to the seller. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWEROF EMINENT DOMAIN 154-56 (1985) (arguing that the notice rule is unfair to sellers
who acquired their property before the law changed); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POITICS 194 (1995) (questioning the fairness of a rule that
prohibits the owner at the time a law becomes more restrictive from transferring a potential
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The second method requires some foresight on the seller's part. The seller
could retain title to the property until obtaining a final decision. Alternatively,
he could structure the transaction creatively so as to preserve the right of one
of the parties to bring a takings claim if the application ultimately is denied.
For example, the would-be seller could give the prospective buyer an option
to purchase the property, thereby allowing the successor to test the effect of
the law while title remains with the original owner. Similarly, the parties
might execute a contract of sale in which satisfactory resolution of the seller's
permit dispute is a condition precedent to the buyer's obligation to close.'
By using methods such as these, the parties can ensure that a sale of the
property does not lead to an unintended waiver of a budding takings claim.
In other cases, the original owner will be closer to the beginning of the
ripening process. In these settings, the extent to which an intervening change
in the law will limit the use of the property may be less clear. The law may
be new, the change may have been unexpected, 54
' the original owner may have
done nothing to ripen his claim, and there may be no administrative precedent.
In these cases, the original owner can legitimately claim ignorance as to how
restrictive the law will be when applied.' These cases still fall within the
sixth category of claims-those which are unripe under the finality
prong-but they are "more unripe" than the cases just described.'56

takings claim to a successor owner); THOMAS J. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON,
COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 82

(1996) (observing that "the threat of a regulation had to arise unexpectedly at some point in
time"); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance and Michelman: Comments
on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 288-89
(1988) (arguing that a rule barring post-enactment buyers from receiving compensation takes
property from the parties who sold land to them; the discussion apparently presupposes an
unripe as-applied claim).
153. See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 140-42 (discussing these
methods and others); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14(1984) (noting that
"some [burdens] are so substantial and unforeseeable... that 'justice and fairness' require that
they be borne by the public as a whole").
155. In Rukab v. City ofJacksonville Beach, 811 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the
court allowed a post-enactment purchaser's claim to proceed. The court noted, "In the instant
case, the Rukabs correctly point out that the designation of the area as 'blighted' was not
confiscatory in nature, nor was adoption of the Redevelopment Plan.... The first opportunity
to challenge the propriety ofthe taking was during this eminent domain proceeding." Id. at 733
(citation omitted); see also Moroney v. Borough of Old Tappan, 633 A.2d 1045, 1048-49 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (allowing a post-enactment purchaser to pursue a variance and
takings compensation in a case in which the prior owner had not exhausted all remedial
measures after an earlier denial of a hardship variance).
156. In Richard Roeser Profl Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545 (Md.
2002), an original owner was subject to an area restriction that it apparently had not tested.
When the successor owner was unable to obtain an area variance, the court allowed the
successor's claim to proceed, noting, "if the prior owner has not self-created a hardship, a self-
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If the original owner facing these facts were to sell the property, the
successor owner would have a stronger case than in the previous example.
The successor owner is unlikely to have a much clearer idea as to how the
administrative process will play out than her seller does, but the successor
reasonably should be less pessimistic than in the previous example, in which
all indications were negative." 7 Therefore, the parties will likely agree to a
smaller price discount than in the previous example, reflecting their
reasonably lower level ofpessimism"'5 In constitutional terms, the successor
reasonably has greater expectations and these expectations will be backed by
her investment." 9 These two clashing illustrations suggest that the age of the
new law, the extent to which it was foreseeable, the amount of administrative
precedent, the degree to which the original owner ripened his claim, and the
price the successor paid for the land all should factor into a court's assessment
of the merits of the successor's claim.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"6 presents an example of
landowners in this sixth category whose claim was allowed to proceed. At
the time the Nollans acquired their interest in the property, they were on
notice that their ability to replace the house on the land would be restricted.'
The Court ruled in their favor anyway, noting, "So long as the [state agency]
could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without
compensating them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred
their full property rights in conveying the lot."' 62 The Palazzolo Court quoted
this sentence from Nollan with approval and rejected the state's suggestion
created hardship is not immaculately conceived merely because the new owner obtains title."
Id. at 561.
157. Cf State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345,352-53 (Ohio
2002) (recognizing that, under Palazzolo, successor owners' claims are not barred even if they
had notice of a previously enacted land-use restriction; the opinion does not discuss the prior
owner's behavior but suggests that the prior owner had made no effort to ripen its as-applied
claim).
158. For a discussion of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable investmentbacked expectations, see Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 268-69 (2001). See
generally Daniel R. Mandeiker, Investment-Backed Expectationsin TakingLaw, 27 URB. LAW.

215, 232-37 (1995) (discussing the extent to which regulatory uncertainty determines the
strength of investment-backed expectations).
159. If a court were to let this claim proceed, it would be determining that the successor
owner is the owner at the time of the alleged taking and thus may bring the claim. Conversely,
the predecessor will have relinquished the property before the alleged taking occurred and may
not bring a claim of his own. See. e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (rejecting a claim by the former owner that no longer held a valid property interest
at the time of the alleged taking), cert. denied sub. nom, E.Minerals Int'l, Inc. v. United States,
122 S. Ct. 1960 (2002).
160. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
161. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30212 (West 1986), cited in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828,
830.
162.

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2.
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that Nollan should be limited.' 63 At the same time, the Palazzolo majority
failed to adopt Justice Scalia's suggestion in concurrence that pre-existing
limitations "should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the
restriction . . . constitute[s] a taking."'"
Rather, the Palazzolo Court
concluded its discussion of the notice issue by equivocally noting, "We have
no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative
enactment can be deemed a background
principle of state law or whether
65
those circumstances are present here."'
The particular facts in Nollan help to explain why the Nollans prevailed
while other post-enactment purchasers of property-including, perhaps,
Palazzolo on remand-might not. The exaction that the California Coastal
Commission demanded of the Nollans involved an easement, and the Court
expressed particular concern about the fact that the agency's permit condition
allowed a physical occupation of the Nollans' beach by the public. 166 Even
the intrusive nature of this physical occupancy was not determinative, with the
Court observing that "the condition would be constitutional even if it
consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their
property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house
would interfere."' 67 The state demanded something different of the Nollans,
however, and "[t]he evident constitutional propriety disappears ... if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition." '68
The physical nature of the occupancy, combined with the lack of a nexus
between the agency's goals and the condition the agency imposed, persuaded
the Court that the state simply was using the Nollans' request for a building
permit as a pretext to allow it to seize for free a property right for which it
would otherwise have to pay. The landowners' knowledge at the time they
acquired the property that the state intended to exact lateral access easements
from beachfront owners did not undercut their claim, for this "exercise of the
State's regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel
compensation.' 6m9 The statute the Nollans faced apparently was one of those
163. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001) (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834 n.2).
164. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 629.
166. "We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use,
'the right to exclude (others is] "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property .... Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
167. Id. at 836. The Court noted that this permanent grant of beach access would be
acceptable because it would protect the public's view of the beach in much the same way as a
prohibition on construction would. Id. at 836-37.
168. Id. at 837.
169. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2 (noting that "the

2002]

TAKINGS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

"enactments [that] are unreasonable and do not become less so through
passage of time or title."' 7°
A somewhat different approach might be warranted in cases in which the
successor did not purchase the property in a traditional market transaction. A
party who acquires property after a change in the law may have succeeded to
title as a result of the death of the prior owner, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
a sale in bankruptcy, a sale for nonpayment of property taxes, or the
dissolution of a marriage. 7' This successor may have been unable to govern
the timing of the transfer and may have paid nothing, or less than full value,
for the property. These facts should not weaken her claim, a point Justice
O'Connor recognized in Palazzolo.72
The successor party may not have been in a position to negotiate the terms
of the transfer of the original owner's property, to control the timing of this
transfer, or to adjust the purchase price (if any) in order to factor in the
existence or non-existence of any possible takings claim. Similarly, her
predecessor may have had little control over the transfer of the property.
Successors of this type, to a greater extent than successors who purchase
property at arm's length, should be permitted some latitude in enjoying the
rights of a predecessor.' By holding that notice is not a categorical bar to a
successor's claim, the Court allows the lower courts to consider these factors
when weighing the significance of the subsequent owner's knowledge of the
prior change in law. 74
announcement that the application for (or granting o0 [a] permit will entail the yielding of a
property interest cannot be regarded as establishing [a] voluntary 'exchange"' (quoting
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984))).
170. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
171.

See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?, supra note 16, at 161-63 (describing and

discussing these methods of obtaining title); see also United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288,
292-93 (1952) (discussing statutory and case-law exceptions to the federal Anti-Assignment
Act).
172. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,634-35 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that "[w]e also have never held that a takings claim isdefeated simply on account of the
lack of a personal financial investment by a postenactment acquirer of property, such as adonee,
heir, or devisee") (citation omitted); see also Steven J.Eagle, The Rise and Rise of "Investment-

Backed Expectations," 32 URB.LAW. 437, 440 (2000) (noting that the interests of devisees
should be protected under the expectations test); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web ofExpectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1993) (noting
that "[t]he government cannot take property from a donee anymore than it can take it from a
buyer").
173. Cf.Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 761-63 (Pa.
2002) (relying heavily on Palazzolo in refusing to bar a claim by a post-enactment owner ina
case in which a trust transferred property to a second trust with no new beneficiaries); see also
Richard Roeser Prof'I Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545, 548 & n.4 (Md.
2002) (considering, in dictum, the application of the self-created hardship rule to a postenactment owner who acquires property by testamentary devise or by operation of law).
174. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (noting that the state's proposed rule, when applied
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Only some takings cases present successor owners who are bringing
claims that their predecessors failed to ripen. Of these, only some are unripe
under the finality prong of the Court's ripeness test when the original owner
transfers the property. Still fewer of these cases involve parties with little idea
as to how the government will apply the new law to the land. And in these
cases a court still must assess the importance of a wide range of factors. In
the end, Palazzolo,like Lucas, may turn out to be a case that is cited regularly
but that changes the outcome of few disputes.
As this careful review of the six types of takings cases has shown, most
takings claims will not benefit from Palazzolo's outcome. Palazzolo's
holding that a successor's notice of an intervening change in the law is not a
complete bar to her maintenance of a takings claim will change the outcome
of few actual cases. In five of the six types of takings cases, a successor
owner will be unable to proceed, and even in the sixth type of case, that claim
often will be weak. Rather, the enduring legacy of the case may prove to be
its hearty reaffirmation of Penn Central'sexpectations test. The Palazzolo
opinions dispel any doubts as to the continuing vitality of Penn Central.
Reasonable investment-backed expectations will continue to weigh heavily in
future takings cases, including those cases in which an owner acquires
property with notice of an existing restriction in the land-use law.
IV. TAHOE-SIERRA AND REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECrATIONS

Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncilv. TahoeRegionalPlanningAgency'"
presented somewhat different facts and did not implicate the notice rule as
directly as Palazzolohad. But by reaffirming Palazzolo, relying on portions
of its reasoning, and repeatedly referring to Penn Centralwith approval, this
more recent case confirms the resuscitation of Penn Central's approach to
reasonable investment-backed expectations. This Part begins with a short
summary of the facts of the case and the Supreme Court's decision, turns next
to a more detailed analysis of Tahoe-Sierra'simplications for the notice rule,
and concludes with a discussion of some other noteworthy points the case
raises.

in contexts such as these, might be "capricious in effect" and "quixotic"); see also id. at 635
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts "must attend to those circumstances which
are probative of what fairness requires in a given case"); id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that "much depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change
of ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might otherwise
exist"); cf Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1997) (Wesley, J.,
dissenting) (noting the "interesting alchemy [of the notice rule] on the estate of a decedent').
175. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
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A. The Facts,Briefly, and the Supreme Court's Decision

California and Nevada formed the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) in 1968 as a means of coordinating development of the ecologically
fragile lake that straddles their common border. 7 6 Between August 1981 and
April 1984, while it was attempting to formulate a long-range regional
environmental plan, TRPA imposed back-to-back development moratoria that
froze all development on some land in the vicinity of Lake Tahoe and sharply
curtailed development on other land.' While the second moratorium was in
place, the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and a group of individual
landowners filed suits that were consolidated in federal district court in
Nevada."s
The district court found that TRPA had not taken the plaintiffs' property
under the partial takings analysis of Penn Central.'9 The court found that the
plaintiffs "'did not have reasonable, investment-backed expectations that they
would be able to build single-family homes on their land within the six-year
period involved in this lawsuit."""0 However, the district court also found
that TRPA had taken the property by temporarily depriving the owners of all
economically viable use under a Lucas analysis and awarded compensation
to the plaintiffs for either eight or thirty-two months, depending on the zone
in which their land was located.'
TRPA appealed, arguing that there had been no taking, and the plaintiffs
appealed, claiming that the temporary taking actually had endured for six
years. Significantly, the plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's holding
that there was no taking under Penn Central. The Ninth Circuit sided with
TRPA on both issues."" With respect to the Lucas argument, the court of
appeals held that the district court incorrectly examined only a temporal slice
of the property; had it looked at the parcel as a whole, it could not have found
that TRPA deprived the plaintiffs of all economically viable use, and thus, a
Lucas taking could not have occurred.8 3

176. Id. at 1471-72.
177. Id. at 1472-73.
178. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 611 F.Supp. 110, 112
(D. Nev. 1985).
179. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1475.
180. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.Supp.
2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999)). Note that the Supreme Court examined a time period
consisting of only thirty-two months of this six-year period.
181. Id. at 1475-76.
182. Id. at 1476.
183. Id. at 1476-77 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764, 773-77 (9th Cir. 2000)). A divided Ninth Circuit denied TRPA's petition for a
rehearing en banc. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998
(9th Cir. 2000).
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The Supreme Court affirmed.'" The Court rejected the argument that the
moratorium categorically took a thirty-two-month temporal segment of the
owners' land, thereby reaffirming that takings law should focus on the whole
parcel and not temporal slices of it.'85 Lucas, the Court noted, should be
applied only in cases in which a regulation permanently deprives an owner of
all use of property; in all other cases, a more nuanced approach is needed.'86
In addition,
fairness and justice do not demand the application of a contrary
87

rule. 1

The Supreme Court's treatment of the takings issue is easier to fathom in
Tahoe-Sierrathan in Palazzolo. Six members of the Court joined a single
opinion penned by Justice Stevens, while the three dissenters authored only
two opinions, one of them quite brief. Thus, a detailed headcount of the
Justices is unnecessary. Moreover, the Court does not address expectations
and the notice rule head on, as it was forced to do in Palazzolo. Justice
Stevens faces only the narrow issue on which the Court granted certiorari,
which, as the discussion above shows, differs substantially from the issues
Palazzolopresented. Because this Article focuses on expectations and notice,
the next Section will examine more closely those portions of Tahoe-Sierra
that are directly germane to this theme.
B. How Tahoe-SierraAffects the Analysis of Reasonable InvestmentBacked Expectations

Tahoe-Sierrareinforces the analysis set forth in Part III in three indirect
ways. First, the case repeatedly cites Penn Central and Palazzolo with
approval. Second, Tahoe-Sierraemphasizes the great distaste the Justices
have for adopting per se rules in regulatory takings cases. Third, the Court
emphasizes the enormous distinction between physical and regulatory takings.
In all three of these ways, the Court indicates that whatever questions there
may have been about the viability of Penn Centralbefore 2001, there is no
doubt that Penn Central'sapproach to expectations remains strong after 2002.
Two of these three points overlap to a great degree. Tahoe-Sierra cites
Palazzolo and Penn Centralnumerous times, and one of the principal points
for which it cites these cases is the proposition that fact-specific land-use
claims resist falling into patterns and therefore must be treated on a case-bycase basis. The Tahoe-Sierraopinion repeatedly emphasizes the continuing
vitality of Penn Central, both by citing Penn Central directly and by
referencing portions of Palazzolo that had themselves relied on Penn Central.

184.
185.
186.
187.

Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1465.
Id. at 1483-84.
Id. at 1482-84
Id. at 1484-89.
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The Court in Tahoe-Sierra"[r]esist[s] '[t]he temptation to adopt what
amount to per se rules in either direction"""8 and concludes that "the
circumstances in this case are best analyzed within the Penn Central
framework."'8 9
The opinion emphasizes that its regulatory takings
jurisprudence "is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"'"90
that are "designed to allow 'careful examination and weighing of all the
''
relevant circumstances,"".'
and notes the importance of "'the multifactor
inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.'"" The
Court recalls that it has "' generally eschewed' any set formula for determining
how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in "'essentially ad hoc, factual
93
inquiries .....
Tahoe-Sierra approvingly quotes Justice O'Connor's Palazzolo
concurrence for its statements that "'interference with investment-backed
' that
expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine," ' ' 94
"'Penn Centraldoes not supply mathematically precise variables, but instead
provides important guideposts, ' "" and that "'[t]he temptation to adopt what
amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.""" Contrasting
Penn Central's nuanced approach with a more straightforward categorical
rule, the Court concludes that "the extreme categorical rule that any
deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a
compensable taking surely cannot be sustained,"'9 and gives short shrift to a
proposal from one amicus curiae that Penn Central should be overruled.9 8
Near the end of its opinion, the Court quotes at length from Justice
O'Connor's Palazzolo concurrence, which stressed that "' [o]ur polestar ...
remains the principles set forth in Penn Centralitself and our other cases that
govern partial regulator, takings. Under these cases, interference with
investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must
examine.'""99

188. Id. at 1478 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 US. 606,636 (2001) (O'Connor,
J.concurring)).
189.

Id. at 1478.

190. Id. at 1478 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. CityofNew York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
191. Id. at 1478 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636).
192. Id. at 1480 n. 18 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 440 (1982) (citing Penn Central,438 U.S. 104)).
193. Id. at 1481 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
(quoting Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124)).

194.

Id. at 1481 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 1485.
Id. at 1484-85.

199.

Id. at 1486 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). This

heavy reliance on Justice O'Connor's concurrence may have helped to cement her decision, and
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Over and over, then, the Tahoe-Sierraopinion returns to Penn Central
and the many cases that have cited Penn Central. There can be no doubt after
Tahoe-Sierrathat Penn Central has been restored to its central place in the
pantheon of regulatory takings cases. Whatever appeal categorical rules may
hold from an administrative perspective, "the 'temptation to adopt what
amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.""'2 In summary,

"the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects
a taking is neither 'yes, always' nor 'no, never'; the answer depends upon the
particular circumstances of the case."2'

The Court also goes out of its way to distinguish between direct
condemnations and inverse physical takings, which lend themselves to
categorical treatment, and inverse regulatory takings, which require more fact-

specific handling.2" This distinction mirrors Justice Kennedy's discussion for
the Palazzolo majority noted at length above."' The Tahoe-Sierraopinion
returns to several World War H-era cases in which the government condemned
leaseholds by physical occupation, pointing out that categorical treatment is
appropriate for a physical occupation even if the taking is a temporary one.2
But physical occupations differ from regulatory takings. "'The first
category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second necessarily
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of
government actions.' 25 A physical appropriation is always a taking, no
matter how substantial the government's interest or how small a loss the
landowner suffers. Conversely, land-use regulations often affect property
value, but most regulations do not categorically take property. 3 ° Moreover,
physical takings are much easier to recognize.
Tahoe-Sierradid not have to address the notice rule or the question of
reasonable investment-backed expectations as directly as Palazzolo had

that of Justice Kennedy, tojoin the majority in Tahoe-Sierra. See id. at 1488 (quoting at length
from Justice Kennedy's discussion of ripeness in his majority opinion in Palazzolo).
200. Id. at 1489 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The
Court quotes this phrase several times in different contexts, and this Article has done the same.
201. Id. at 1478. The Court is quite clear here that it is not holding that a temporary
moratorium can never effect a taking, id. at 1478 n.16, but only that a per se rule is
inappropriate and that a more fact-specific approach demands application of Penn Central's
standards. See also id. at 1486 (noting that "we do not hold that the temporary nature of a landuse restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not
be given exclusive significance one way or the other").
202. Id. at 1478-80.
203. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
204. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478-79 (citing cases).
205. Id. at 1479 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
206. Id. at 1479. The Court proceeds to distinguish UnitedStates v. Pewee CoalCo., 341
U.S. 114 (1951), in which the government physically took control of a coal mine, from United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), in which the government merely
issued a wartime order shutting down operations at nonessential gold mines. Tahoe-Sierra, 122
S. Ct. at 1479 n.18; see also supra note 101.
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during the previous Term. The Court's repeated reliance on Penn Central and
on Palazzolo's support for Penn Central and its heavy emphasis on the
distinction between physical and regulatory takings, however, leave little
doubt that its attitude toward these issues had only hardened in the intervening
months. The Court reaffirmed Palazzolo'snotice-rule holding indirectly, but
strongly.
C. Other Noteworthy Points Raised by Tahoe-Sierra
This Article has focused on only those aspects of Palazzolo and TahoeSierra that have a direct impact on the notice rule and the Court's treatment
of reasonable investment-backed expectations. However, the Court did
address other aspects of regulatory takings law in both cases. These
points-particularly as raised and discussed in Tahoe-Sierra-suggestthat the
regulatory takings pendulum may be swinging back toward the middle of its
arc. Many Court-watchers feel that the Court tilted more toward landowners
until 1987 and then swung in the other direction from that year until
Palazzolo. The Court's treatment of the notice rule and other issues in
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierrasuggests that it may be attempting to come to rest
in the center.
This Section describes other aspects of regulatory takings law that the
Court addressed in one or both of these cases, and particularly in TahoeSierra. The Court's analysis of these other issues offers some hints as to the
Court's future treatment of reasonable investment-backed expectations. In
particular, Tahoe-Sierra'sdiscussion of the so-called "denominator problem,"
its treatment of the 1987 opinion in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 7 and its discussion of the circularity
problem all indicate that regulatory takings law may finally be arriving at a
reasonably balanced middle ground.
The denominator problem first became evident in PennsylvaniaCoal Co.
v. Mahon, in 1922.2"8 There, Justice Brandeis, the lone dissenter, noted that
"[i]f we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction,
we should compare it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is,
with the value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole
property. '' 21 Justice Brandeis worried that property owners might maximize

207.
208.

482 U.S. 304 (1987).
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (noting the importance of the "extent of the diminution"

in value).
209. Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v.
District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879-82 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing the difficulties in
identifying the denominator of the fraction that represents diminution in value), cert. denied,

531 U.S. 812 (2000); id. at 885 (Williams, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[t]he larger the parcel,
the greater the chance that the regulated land will retain an economically viable use");
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing
the denominator problem).

TENNESSEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 69:891

the size of this fraction and exaggerate their losses by understating the amount
of property with which they began. The denominator problem has proved to
be troublesome, and the Court has never made clear exactly how to calculate
the denominator of this takings fraction.2 t °
Tahoe-Sierra does not entirely solve this problem, but it goes part of the
way toward clarifying the approach courts must take. The Tahoe-SierraCourt
begins by restating Justice Brennan's language for the Penn Central Court
that the analysis must "'focus on 'the parcel as a whole.""'2 ' In a lengthy
quote from Penn Central,the Court reaffirms that takings analysis "'does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.' 2 12 Rather, "'the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.""'2 3
When it notes that a property interest may not be severed temporally,
however, the Court is addressing a facet of the denominator problem that Penn
Centraldid not raise. "Thus, the District Court erred when it disaggregated
petitioners' property into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations
at issue and then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all

economically viable use during each period.

'2 4

The Court rejects the

contention that "we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the
remainder of each landowner's fee simple estate, and then ask whether that
segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria."2 ' Such an approach,
the Court concludes, would vastly and inappropriately increase the number of
takings. "With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban
....Petitioners' 'conceptual severance' argument is unavailing [under Penn
Central] ... t6 The duration of a regulation is one of the many factors a
court must consider when analyzing a putative taking under Penn Central,but
210. See, e.g., Timothy J. Dowling, The Parcel-as-a-WholeRule and Its Importance in
DefendingAgainstRegulatory Takings Challenges,in TAKING SIDES, supranote 101, at 75,7679 (providing background on the denominator problem and suggesting that the parcel-as-awhole rule provides some clarity).
211. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481
(2002) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)). The
Court is not quoting directly from Penn Centralhere but does include a footnote remarking
upon Justice O'Connor's reaffirmation of the Penn Central approach in her concurrence in
Palazzolo. Id. at 1481 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633, 634, 636 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). The Tahoe-Sierraopinion also quotes other similar language from Penn Central
at length.
212. Id. at 1481 (quoting Penn Central,438 U.S. at 130-3 1).
213. Id. (citing several cases as illustrations). In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), for
example, the Court held that "'where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the
destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking."' Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481
(quoting Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66).
214. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1483 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'
Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242-45 (D. Nev. 1999)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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a court should not slice a fee simple into small time-demarcated slices and
then examine the effect the temporary regulation has on just one of those
slices. 17 The denominator problem differs from the notice rule, but the
Court's treatment of both issues indicates that it will provide regulators a
certain amount of leeway, an approach that accords with more general
separation of powers and federalism principles.21
The Court also clarifies the meaning of its 1987 decision in FirstEnglish

EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles. 19 The Tahoe-Sierra

petitioners argued that, under First English, a regulation that temporarily
denies an owner all use of property is a taking, but the Tahoe-Sierra Court
disagreed, finding that "FirstEnglish surely did not approve, and implicitly
rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are now advocating. 220
Rather, First English addressed only the remedial question of whether
compensation is appropriate after a court concludes that the government has
temporarily taken property. "[T]he [FirstEnglish] Court unambiguously and
repeatedly characterized the issue to be decided as a 'compensation question'
or a 'remedial question." 22' Whatever uncertainties FirstEnglish may have
created, Tahoe-Sierrahas resolved fifteen years later.
In its discussion of the denominator problem, the Tahoe-Sierra Court
notes in passing that some types of circularity seem unavoidable in takings
analysis. "Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very
regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every delay
would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike
would constitute categorical takings. 2 Stated differently, the question of
whether property has been taken depends to an enormous degree on how one
defines "property."
This problem is not restricted to the definition of the denominator. The
entire concept of reasonable investment-backed expectations may fall prey to
circularity criticisms, for the reasonableness of an expectation and the

217. Id. at 1489.
218. See Echeverria, Three-FactorTest, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that the "'parcel as a
whole' rule "respects the basic principle that elected representatives, rather than judges, have
primary responsibility for setting social policy in this country").
219. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
220. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482.
221. Id. (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 311). Note that, on remand, the California
Court of Appeal found that Los Angeles had not taken the church's property. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893,904-06 (Cal. Ct,
App. 1989). This fact confirms the point that the Supreme Court's decision addressed only the
remedy question.
The Tahoe-Sierra Court also refers back to Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which
laid the groundwork for FirstEnglish. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482 (citing San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
222. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483.
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willingness of an owner to invest based on that expectation depend on what
the Court previously has held owners should expect.223 Circularity problems
are not unique to Tahoe-Sierra; in fact, the Penn Central Court made an
oversight when it failed to note that an owner's expectations are shaped by a
body of law that includes the Court's statements as to what that owner's
expectations may be.224 This wrinkle is not fatal to the Court's mode of
inquiry, however, and "[s]ome circularity must be tolerated in these
matters." 22 5
Palazzolo similarly illustrates that some circularity is unavoidable in
takings law, for the outcome of that case would have been circular no matter
what the Court had decided. All owners would thereafter take property with
notice of the outcome of that case-no matter which outcome the Court had
chosen-and would need to factor this new strand of property law into their
future expectations as to what property is. The Palazzolo Court held that
those who acquire property with notice of a pre-existing change in the law
may nonetheless challenge that law as a taking. A buyer's investment-backed
expectations may therefore reasonably include the right to challenge existing
laws and-occasionally-recover. The reasonable buyer may pay slightly more
than she otherwise would have for land that has recently been restricted,
because Palazzolotells her that the land comes with an additional stick in the
bundle of rights, namely the legal ability to bring a takings claim. Similarly,
the reasonable seller will receive slightly more, because he is selling a
possible legal victory along with his land. The Court clarified what past
expectations include and concomitantly shaped future expectations. 226 Had
Palazzolo come out the other way, the result would be different but just as
circular.2 2 This stick in the property bundle would be non-transferable,
buyers would pay just a bit less for recently regulated land, sellers would
receive less, and the Court would have shaped future expectations in just the

223.

See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV.

509, 522 (1986) (calling reliance arguments circular because they "implicitly assume that it is
reasonable to expect laws never to change-a particularly perverse assumption given that laws
change quite frequently, and often in predictable ways") (footnote omitted).
224. Justice Kennedy picked up on this point in his concurrence in Lucas, noting, "There
is an inherent tendency towards circularity in [the reasonable investment-backed expectations]
synthesis, of course; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow
as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is."
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 1034.
226. See also Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1997)
(discussing the circularity problem).

227. See Kaplow, supra note 223, at 525 (noting that "the counter-argument [to the
reliance argument]... is similarly flawed"). But see Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the

Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 7 (1996)
(arguing that treating pre-existing statutes as inherent limitations on title reduces circularity

problems).
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opposite way. 2'8
This type of recursiveness is acceptable and probably unavoidable. The
Court long has recognized that property-to an extent that is difficult to
29
determine-is nothing more than what legislatures and courts say it is.
Each new opinion tweaks the definition of property and, thus, all persons'
reasonable expectations as to what property has become. Every time a court
resolves a takings case or a legislature modifies the contours of property, the
body of property law is altered once again. From that point on, expectations
as to what property is must factor in this change. Moreover, future changes

are inevitable, even though the specifics of these future changes may be

difficult to foresee. 3 °
The precise contours of these future modifications will sometimes be
unpredictable, but past modifications are often well settled. Several of the
Justices in Palazzolo wondered how old a change in law must be before a
purchaser should be deemed to be on notice of it. Palazzolo instructs that an
owner who acquires property with knowledge of an existing law is not
categorically barred from challenging that law as a taking. The Court held
that "a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent
compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State's
law by mere virtue of the passage of title."23' 1 Lucas recognized that
background principles of property law may undercut even a claim for a total
taking, but "[a] law does not become a background principle for subsequent

228. This second approach may be more desirable from ajudicial perspective, as it reduces
problems of proof. See Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim?,supra note 16, at 105-09, 111-12,
154-61 (demonstrating the benefits of this approach).
229. See, e.g.,Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413(1922) (noting that "some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone').
230. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 646 (1993) (rejecting the employer's takings claim because the employer had "no
reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling [for liability for employee benefits] would
never be lifted"); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reaching a similar
result in a case involving real property), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000); cf E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion) (reaching a different result in a case in which a
subsequent change in the law could not have been foreseen). Good, in many ways, serves as
a perfect reflection of Palazzolo. Under Palazzolo, a property owner may prevail even though
the law had changed before she acquired the property. Under Good, a government body may
prevail even though the law did not change until after the owner acquired the property. The
Palazzoloholding suggests that plaintiffs in the position that Good was in will have a stronger
case under the Penn Central balancing test than will plaintiffs in the position of Palazzolo
himself. But one ofPalazzolo's important lessons is its confirmation of the extent to which the
Court disfavors per se rules in takings law. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636
(2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (cautioning that "[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to
per se rules in either direction must be resisted").
231. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30.
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'
owners by enactment itself."232
Moreover, under the more flexible Penn
Central test, a "claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired
after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction. 233
This does not mean that courts must look indefinitely into the past. The
issue arose twice during oral argument in Palazzolo. In a question to counsel
for Palazzolo, Justice Souter asked, "[I]f rights to land use pass from owner
to owner like that, how far back does the chain go?... [I]t seems to me that
there's no logical stopping place until you get back to Roger Williams and the
17th century settlement. So where do we draw the line?9 234 Palazzolo
theoretically might challenge ancient statutes that impaired the rights of
owners long ago, and certainly long enough ago to predate modem land-use
controls.
A second comment from one of the Justices raised the related problem
that arises when a court must determine what the relevant parcel is for the
purpose of calculating its diminution in value. The denominator a court
applies will depend on the time the court selects to look at the property and
the size of the parcel at that time. Rhode Island, which wanted a small
fraction and a large denominator, argued that a court must look at the history
of the property in determining what the relevant parcel is for purposes of
making this calculation. One of the Justices responded by noting that
"[e]verything's been whittled down from Lord Fairfax, I mean, in Virginia
anyway, nobody would be able to make a takings claim. '23
Palazzolo does not solve this knotty problem. In rejecting the state's
argument for a strong version of the notice rule, the Court held that "[a]
regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background principle for some
owners but not for others"236 but then remanded the case on this point. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence notes that "the timing of the regulation's enactment
relative to the acquisition of title is [neither] immaterial [nor of] ... exclusive
significance. '237 Justice Scalia, in contrast, would give "no bearing"23 to this
factor.
Justice Breyer, dissenting, would carry Justice O'Connor's point even
further. He notes that "[o]rdinarily, such expectations will diminish in force
and significance-rapidly and dramatically-as property continues to change
hands over time. '239 Justice Stevens "would treat the owner['s] notice as

232. Id. at 630.
233. Id.
234. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 99-2047, 2001 WL 196990, at *17 (Feb. 26, 2001)
(oral argument). The attribution to Justice Souter comes from Peter B. Lord, R.I. 's Final
Arguments-Justices Pepper Lawyers with Questions, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 27, 2001, at A I.
235. Palazzolo, 2001 WL 196990, at *41 (oral argument).
236. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
237. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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relevant... but not necessarily dispositive."2 ° However, if Palazzolo can
assume his predecessor's rights, Justice Stevens worries that "there is no
reason why such regulations should limit the rights of the second, the third,
or the thirtieth purchaser."24 ' Finally, Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent for
three of the Justices, "would, at a minimum, agree ...
that transfer of title can
impair a takings claim."24 2
All the Justices recognize that anything other than a categorical ban of
Palazzolo's claim raises a challenging timing question, but the Court does not
provide much guidance as to what types of expectations are reasonable in this
context. This variant of the circularity problem may be unavoidable, but the
lack of consensus on the extent to which a current owner may step into the
shoes of a predecessor provides little direction to the lower courts.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is unlikely to take another case like Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island. By rejecting a categorical rule and reaffirming the viability of
Penn Central,the Court announced that individual judges or panels must do
their best to be fair on the facts of individual cases. These jurists should be
guided by the different takings standards the Court has already established and
developed in Penn Central and other cases. But for the large majority of
regulatory takings claims that do not fall within a few categorical rules,243
fairness apparently is more important than predictability. 2" The Court will
not create a thicket of categorical rules;245 instead, "the default rule remains
that, in the regulatory taking context, we require a more fact specific
inquiry.""' This case-by-case approach does not lend itself well to appellate
240. Id. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
243. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that the
deprivation of all economically viable use of property is a taking per se); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that the permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking per se); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987) (holding that right to devise property is a valuable property right).
244. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for
Pragmatism,Symbolism, andAd Hoc Balancing,80 NEB. L. REV. 465,468 (2001) (observing
that "[t]hough clarity is generally preferred in Supreme Court opinions, it may not be possible
or desirable where there is no cultural agreement on the relative importance of competing
values"). See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988) (distinguishing between hard-edged rules and more ambiguous, but more equitable,
standards).
245. "When... [an] owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation
imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the
predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex." Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1478 n.17 (2002).
246. Id. at 1484.
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review, and as long as the lower courts appear to be applying the general
standards the Court has endorsed, the Court is likely to shy away from secondguessing them. Lawyers will need to help the courts discern precisely which
factors are most important in specific cases, a job for which lawyers are well
suited.
The Court's two most recent pronouncements may restore some balance
to takings law, and supporters of both landowners and government regulators
can find reason for satisfaction with the Court's recent decisions. Landowners
and their lawyers may be mollified by Palazzolo'sholding that notice of a law
is not a bar to a takings challenge. A landowner who challenges a law that
already existed when she obtained title will not necessarily prevail, and
Palazzolo had little new to say about when a sequence of government actions
amounts to a taking. However, Palazzolo will allow some claims to survive
that otherwise would not have, and some of these claimants ultimately will
receive compensation. Regulators and their lawyers are likely to be happy
with Tahoe-Sierra'soverall holding, its broad reading of Penn Central,its
rejection of per se rules, its approach to the denominator problem, its
clarification that FirstEnglish was purely a remedial case, and its reliance on
certain helpful passages in Palazzolo'ssix opinions.
The current Justices may have more experience than Justice Holmes had
with takings claims, but they have fared little better than he did nearly a
century ago, when he noted, "It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones
between the private right of property and the police power when... we know
of few decisions that are very much in point."247 The Court's two most recent
takings opinions leave much for the lower courts to resolve in individual cases
as they arise. Results are likely to be mixed and occasionally contradictory,
but that is what the Court appears to want and that may be the best that any
Court can do. 48 The hodge-podge of opinions in so many of the Court's
recent cases suggests that the nine Justices themselves have great difficulty
agreeing on anything in this challenging area of the law. Surely they expect
no more of lower court judges, government regulators, property owners, and
lawyers.

247. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
248. "[W]e readily can understand why the doctrine in this area is so confused and
confusing; why there is, in short, a 'takings puzzle.' To my mind, it is much more difficult to
understand why anyone would expect matters to be otherwise." James E. Krier, The TakingsPuzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1997); see also Carol M. Rose, Property
and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 1
(distinguishing typical regulatory takings claims from everyday housekeeping changes, at one
extreme, and revolutionary expropriations, at another).

